Three Experimental Studies of Reward and Decision Making by Kang, Min Jeong
  
Three Experimental Studies of Reward and Decision Making 
Thesis by 
Min Jeong Kang 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, California 
 
2010 
(Defended August 20, 2009) 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2010 
Min Jeong Kang 
All Rights Reserved 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
To the memory of my father 
 
  
iv 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank my advisor and mentor Colin Camerer. I am very much indebted to 
him as I would not have been able to complete this long and demanding journey towards 
the PhD without his guidance.  
He has been a ceaseless source of insights, ideas, and energy (and humor, of course). I 
always found him intellectually stimulating and much enjoyed his jokes in and outside 
the lab. Also, I admire his “mastery” of the English language and flamboyant writing 
style—I wish I could write like him! Despite his busy schedule, he is always easily 
accessible whenever I need his input academically or personally.  
It is very easy for graduate students to drift away without constant reminders, checking 
in, and prodding. Through all these years, he has been diligent about paying attention to 
my progress and keeping me on track. I always felt like he cared about my work. I very 
much appreciate his devotion of his energy and time to advise and train me.  
Of course, no thesis would be complete without a thesis committee. In this regard, I am 
deeply grateful to Antonio Rangel, Ralph Adolphs, and Peter Bossaerts for taking time 
out of their busy schedules to generously serve on my committee and for their valuable 
comments on my dissertation. Further thanks are due to Antonio for his contributions and 
guidance in the second study, on hypothetical and real choices.  
Further, I would like to thank all the professors in HSS that taught me at various points in 
the past five years. They set a foundation for understanding and conducting research in 
social sciences, which was necessary and crucial for this thesis. In this regard, I gratefully 
acknowledge my undergraduate advisor, Youngse Kim at Yonsei University. He inspired 
and encouraged me to pursue a PhD in the U.S. and I am very thankful for what I learned 
from him in college and for all of his support. Without his guidance and encouragement, I 
would not have come here and this thesis would not have existed.  
Throughout my graduate research, I had the good fortune of working with many skilled 
collaborators, to whom much thanks is due. My second chapter was coauthored with 
Ming Hsu, Ian Krajbich, Joseph Wang, Samuel McClure, George Lowenstein and Colin 
Camerer. My third chapter on hypothetical and real decisions was a collaboration with 
Mickael Camus and Colin Camerer. My fourth chapter on optimal timing decisions is an 
ongoing effort with Colin. Furthermore, Meghana Bhatt, Carmina Caringal, Noah Myung 
and Cary Frydman deserve acknowledgement for their help. Colin financially supported 
all of the research; his financial support is greatly appreciated. I am also very grateful to 
Mike Lipper for his generous financial support; my final year at Caltech was funded from 
the Lipper Family Fellowship in Neuroeconomics. 
v 
 
 
 
I would also like to thank the many other people who helped me over the years to 
complete this thesis. I thank Ming Hsu for being such a wonderful coach to get me started 
on fMRI analysis. I also thank Hilke Plassmann, Todd Hare, Cendri Hutcherson and 
Camerer and Rangel lab members for useful comments and help. Especially, I appreciate 
Hilke’s warm friendship and willingness to help anytime.   
Many thanks go to HSS, SSEL, and CASSEL staff for administrative assistance to run 
experiments. I especially appreciate help from Tiffany Kim and Walter Yuan. I should 
not forget to mention Laurel Auchampaugh; she has been of great help all the time and I 
am very grateful for that.   
Personally, I would like to give warm thanks to friends at the Caltech dance clubs and 
CKGSA for all the parties, dancing and good times. I thank Oleg Kogan and David 
Young for fun times dancing together and listening to my concerns. I will not forget the 
countless chit-chats with my classmates, Sera Linardi and Noah Myung. They have been 
great friends and counselors.  
I would especially like to thank Daniel Holland. He deserves a big hug for his constant 
support. He has been of great help, both academically and personally. I will not forget his 
patience and support throughout this difficult time. In particular, I am grateful to him for 
his love, his mastery of the English language (though slightly less sophisticated than 
Colin’s for now), and keeping my clothes clean when I was too busy with this thesis to do 
it myself.  
I would like to reserve my last, but biggest, thanks for my family. I appreciate all their 
support and love from afar. I dedicate this thesis to my late father.  
 
  
vi 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates reward-driven decision making using a combination of techniques 
such as functional neuroimaging, behavioral experiments, and pupilometry. Different 
aspects of reward and decision making were examined in three different studies, 
including the nature of curiosity, similarities and differences in hypothetical and real 
decisions, and optimal-timing decisions. In the study of curiosity, my colleagues and I 
conceptualized information as a rewarding object and curiosity as a form of reward 
anticipation of the rewarding information. We explored this hypothesis using a 
combination of functional neuroimaging, pupillometry, behavioral experiments, and 
memory-retrieval experiments. In the study of hypothetical and real decisions, the neural 
differences and similarities underlying these types of decisions were explored. We 
discuss potential implications of the findings on scientific practices and suggest the 
possibility of a new use of fMRI to improve the prediction of real choices based on 
hypothetical choice data. In the third study, we explore how people make timing 
decisions when motivation to delay trades off against the motivation to take an action 
immediately. We experimentally test current theory and examine how strategic decisions 
become sophisticated over time. We further hypothesize about psychological processes 
that could guide decision making under uncertainty and time pressure. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis contains three independent experimental studies concerned with the general 
theme of human reward processing and decision making. In recent years, the 
development of brain imaging technology has enabled researchers in various disciplines 
to expand our understanding of decision making and valuation. This thesis continues the 
trend using a combination of methods such as functional imaging, behavioral 
experiments, and pupilometry. The studies herein contribute to an understanding of 
reward-driven decision making: (1) by extending a dimension of reward to include more 
abstract objects of higher complexity (information, consumer products); (2) by 
comparing different modalities of decision making (hypothetical and real) on a neural 
level that had not been explored previously; (3) testing decision making when different 
motives conflict in a complex social environment. 
In the following chapter is an experimental study of curiosity itself, which has long 
intrigued philosophers and social scientists and has been described as an important 
motivator of learning. Despite its importance, the psychological and neural substrates of 
curiosity remain poorly understood. In the study, information has been conceptualized as 
a rewarding object and curiosity as a form of reward anticipation of the rewarding 
information. This hypothesis is explored using a combination of functional neuroimaging, 
pupillometry, behavioral experiments, and memory-retrieval experiments. 
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The second study examines the neural differences and similarities underlying 
hypothetical and real consumer decision making. Many studies in social sciences rely on 
hypothetical choice data to infer actual choices, which are often difficult to obtain. 
However, studies in economics have found that hypothetical valuations of goods reflect a 
systematic bias compared to actual preferences. Based on this behavioral difference, we 
further ask if there are different neural circuitries engaged in hypothetical and real 
decisions, and different neural computations are carried out in the brain for hypothetical 
and for real decisions. We discuss potential implications of the findings on practices in 
imaging neuroscience and psychology and further suggest the possibility of a new use of 
fMRI to neurally predict real choices based on hypothetical choices. 
In the last chapter, optimal timing decisions are investigated when motivation to delay 
trades off against motivation to take an action immediately. Current theory is 
experimentally tested in two different environments, and we examine how strategic 
decisions become sophisticated over time. We further hypothesize psychological 
processes that could guide decision making under uncertainty and time pressure. 
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Chapter 2 
Epistemic Curiosity Activates Reward Circuitry and Enhances 
Memory1 
 
“The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curiosity has its own reason for existing. 
One cannot help but be in awe when he contemplates the mysteries of eternity, of life, of 
the marvelous structure of reality. It is enough if one tries merely to comprehend a little 
of his mystery every day. Never lose a holy curiosity.” 
−Albert Einstein 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Curiosity is the complex feeling and cognition accompanying the desire to learn what is 
unknown. Much as curiosity motivates other animal species to explore their environment 
and find sources of food, it plays a critical role in motivating learning and discovery in 
humans, especially by creative professionals, and is necessary for increasing the world’s 
store of knowledge. Apples had fallen from a tree before Newton and have done so after 
him, but it was his curiosity that inspired him to formulate the theory of universal 
gravitation out of such a seemingly inconsequential phenomenon.  Einstein, once said, “I 
have no special talents. I am only passionately curious (Hoffmann 1972).”  
 Although curiosity has made great contributions to advance knowledge and technologies, 
curiosity has a dangerous side in its association with exploratory behaviors having 
harmful consequences. An ancient example is the mythical Pandora, who opened a box 
that unleashed misfortunes on the world. Curiosity is often accused of causing teenagers’ 
                                                            
1 This chapter has been previously published in Kang et al. (2009) and the definitive version is available at 
www.blackwell-synergy.com. 
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thrill seeking, drug and alcohol use, and sexual experimentation. Moreover, pathological 
curiosity leads to behavioral disorders such as perverted voyeurism.  Technology such as 
the Internet augments both good and bad effects of curiosity, by putting both enormous 
amounts of information and potentially dangerous social encounters a mouse click away. 
Despite its importance, the psychological and neural underpinnings of human curiosity 
remain poorly understood. Philosophers and psychologists alike have described curiosity 
as an appetite for knowledge, a drive like hunger and thirst (Loewenstein 1994), the 
hunger pang of an “‘info-vore” (Biederman & Vessel 2006), and “the wick in the candle 
of learning” (William Arthur Ward). In reinforcement learning, a novelty bonus is used to 
motivate the choice of unexplored strategies (Kakade & Dayan 2002); curiosity can be 
thought of as the psychological manifestation of such a novelty bonus.  
Our research is guided, in part, by the theory that curiosity arises from an incongruity or 
“information gap”—a discrepancy between what one knows and what one wants to know 
(Loewenstein 1994). The theory assumes that the aspired level of knowledge increases 
sharply with a small increase in knowledge, so that the information gap grows with initial 
learning. When one is sufficiently knowledgeable, however, the gap shrinks and curiosity 
falls. If curiosity is like a hunger for knowledge, then a small “priming dose” of 
information increases the hunger, and the decrease in curiosity from knowing a lot is like 
being satiated by information. 
In the information-gap theory, the object of curiosity is an unconditioned rewarding 
stimulus: unknown information that is anticipated to be rewarding. Humans (and other 
species, such as cats and monkeys) will expend resources to find out information they are 
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curious about, much as rats will work for a food reward (Loewenstein 1994). Based on 
this observation, we hypothesized that the striatum would be linked to curiosity, as a 
growing body of evidence suggests that activity in the human striatum is correlated with 
the level of reward signals (Hare et al. 2008; Knutson et al. 2000; McClure et al. 2004; 
O'Doherty 2004).  
Guided by the ideas mentioned above, we explored the neural correlates of curiosity in 
one study and tested the hypotheses derived from its findings in two separate studies. In 
all studies, subjects were presented with series of trivia questions chosen to create a 
mixture of high and low “epistemic” curiosity (figure 2.1).2 Subjects were instructed to 
read each question, guess the answer, and rate both their curiosity and how confident they 
were that they knew the answer (P). They were then shown the question again along with 
the correct answer (figure 2.2).  
In the first experiment subjects read the questions during fMRI. In the second experiment 
they performed the same task without scanning, and their memory for answers was tested 
in a follow-up session 1−2 weeks later. In the third experiment, we behaviorally tested 
whether curiosity is indeed a form of reward anticipation. 
2.2  Study 1: Neural Correlates of Curiosity 
Experimental Design and Methods 
Participants and Stimuli 
                                                            
2 Epistemic curiosity refers to a desire to acquire knowledge and applies mainly to humans (Loewenstein, 
1994). 
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Nineteen Caltech students were scanned (average age: 21.7 ± 3.5 years; 14 males, 5 
females; 18 right-handed)3. They earned $20 for participation. Informed consent was 
obtained for all three experiments, using a consent form approved by the Internal Review 
Board at Caltech.  
The stimuli consisted of 40 trivia-type questions, regarding various topics, chosen to 
measure curiosity about semantic knowledge. The questions were pre-tested to reliably 
evoke a range of curiosity levels across individuals (for sample questions, see figure 2.1; 
for the complete list of questions, see appendix 2.7.1).  
 
Figure 2.1 Sample questions with relatively high (left: average 5.72 out of 
7) and low (right: 2.28 out of 7) curiosity ratings. 
 
Experimental Procedure 
Written instructions were provided outside the scanner (appendix 2.7.2). Once subjects 
understood the experimental procedure, they were put in the scanner for the task. Each 
experimental session consisted of 4 runs, with each run containing a set of 10 questions, 
which were randomly presented within each run. There was a one-minute break between 
runs, due to physical restrictions on the scanner. Each trial consisted of 5 epochs: (1) the 
                                                            
3 Initially, 20 subjects participated, but one subject was discarded because he received instructions in the 
scanner instead of outside, and showed odd behavioral data—his mean curiosity rating was “7,” the 
maximum allowed, not creating enough variation in curiosity across questions. 
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first presentation of a question, (2) selection of curiosity rating, (3) confidence rating, (4) 
second presentation of the question, and (5) display of the answer. The curiosity and 
confidence rating epochs were self-paced; the durations of the three presentation/display 
epochs were independently randomized within a set range, which is explained below and 
shown in figure 2.2. The task was presented to subjects through MRI compatible goggles. 
Subjects were given 12 to 15 seconds to read the question, followed by a fixation screen 
displayed for 4 to 6 seconds, and they were instructed to silently guess the answer while 
reading a question. The subjects were then asked to indicate the extent of their curiosity 
about the correct answer as well as the level of confidence they had in their guess. The 
curiosity and confidence rating epochs were self-paced; the subjects moved on to the next 
screen by making their selection with an MRI-compatible button box. These rating 
screens were also followed by fixation-cross screens. After the confidence level was 
entered, the question was presented again for 3 to 5 seconds, and then the answer was 
revealed, below the question, for 4 to 6 seconds. To keep the motor requirement of the 
task minimal, the presentation of questions and answers was designed to not be self-
paced. Each complete cycle, or trial, took about a minute, with the entire experiment 
lasting approximately 45 minutes. Following the scanner part, the subjects were asked to 
self-report their initial guesses at the correct answers to the questions and to fill out a 
questionnaire. This self-reporting part was conducted outside of the scanner, due to the 
difficulty of collecting verbal, typed, or written responses while the subject is inside the 
scanner tube.  
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Figure 2.2 Experimental timeline. 
fMRI Data Acquisition and Preprocessing 
Data were acquired using a 3-T Siemens (Erlangen, Germany) Trio scanner at Caltech. A 
set of high-resolution (0.5  0.5  1.0 mm3) T1-weighted anatomical images was first 
acquired to enable localization of functional images. Whole-brain T2*-weighted 
echoplanar images with blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast were 
acquired in 32 axial slices (64 × 64 voxels; 3 mm thickness and 3 mm in-plane 
resolution) at a repetition time of 2000 ms and echo time of 30 ms. The scan sequences 
were axial slices approximately parallel to the AC-PC axis. The fMRI data were 
preprocessed using SPM2 (Welcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of 
Neurology, London, UK). Functional scans were first corrected for slice timing via linear 
interpolation. Motion correction of images was performed using a 6-parameter affine 
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transformation followed by nonlinear warping using basis functions (Ashburner & 
Friston 1999). Finally, images were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM.  
fMRI Data Analysis 
The data analysis was conducted using the random effects general linear models (GLM) 
for event-related designs in SPM2. In all imaging data analyses, the regressors were 
modeled using box-car functions, convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response 
function. All four runs were concatenated and treated as one run and to control for the 
variance between sessions from concatenation, session dummy variables were included 
as separate regressors. Images were adjusted for both global intensity, using proportional 
scaling; and for low-frequency physiological drifts, using a high-pass filter of 128 
seconds. Autocorrelation of the hemodynamic responses was modeled as an AR(1) 
process. Parameters were estimates from a ReML procedure. We initially performed 19 
separate single-subject analyses: voxel-by-voxel statistical parametric maps of the t-
statistic for each contrast of interest were defined for each subject. These contrast maps 
were then integrated to derive contrast images for second-level group T-tests and 
ANOVA (Ashburner et al. 1997; Friston et al. 1995; Genovese et al. 2002). 
1. Curiosity Median Split Analysis. Each subject's trials were split into two conditions 
(high or low) according to where they fell relative to that individual's median curiosity 
level. Then all five epochs in each trial (first presentation, curiosity rating, confidence 
rating, second presentation, and answer display) were classified as being in the high- or 
low-curiosity condition according to the condition to which the whole trial had been 
assigned. Thus, there were two curiosity conditions for each epoch, resulting in a total of 
10 
 
 
10 separate regressors of interest. Each regressor was time locked to stimulus 
presentation. A GLM including these 10 regressors plus regressors of no interest was 
estimated. The 10 regressors of interest were modeled using box-car functions with the 
length of each epoch (e.g., the presentation time for the first answer) as the corresponding 
box-car duration. We then calculated contrasts to compare the effects of high versus low 
curiosity. 
2. Curiosity interaction analysis. We also examined whether the brain activations 
identified in the median-split analysis increased linearly with curiosity level, rather than 
being associated with two levels (high or low). We estimated a GLM in which 
normalized curiosity was a parametric modulator for each of the five epochs. 
3. Residual curiosity analysis. This analysis was performed to investigate the effect of 
curiosity that is dissociated from confidence level, P, and uncertainty, P(1 − P).4 To do 
this, we first regressed curiosity on P and P(1 − P) 5 (with a constant) and then took the 
residuals from this regression to construct a new variable, called the “residual curiosity.” 
Further, to study the interaction between residual curiosity and correctness of guess, we 
divided the answer-display epochs into correct- and incorrect-guess conditions. This 
procedure resulted in a total of 6 conditions of interest: first presentation, curiosity rating, 
confidence rating, second presentation, answer display preceded by a correct guess, and 
                                                            
4 Uncertainty, P(1 − P), measures a subject’s uncertainty about a guess. A guess is a random variable (more 
specifically, a Bernoulli random variable) with two outcomes, correct or incorrect; the two outcomes have 
probabilities of P (confidence level) and (1− P), respectively. The uncertainty associated with the random 
variable (or uncertainty about which outcome will occur) is measured by the entropy, which in this case is a 
monotonic function of the variance P(1 − P). P(1 − P) is a quadratic function with a maximum at P = 0.5 
and minima at P = 0 and 1. For example, suppose that you are 100% (or 0%) sure about your guess. In this 
case, your confidence level, P, is 1 (or 0). Your uncertainty about the outcome will be minimal. In contrast, 
if your confidence level about your guess is .5, then you are most uncertain about which outcome will 
occur because the two outcomes are equally likely. 
5 Raw curiosity level was normalized at an individual level. See behavioral results. 
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answer display preceded by an incorrect guess. We then estimated a GLM in which 
residual curiosity, P(1 − P), and P were parametric modulators for each of these six 
conditions. 
Behavioral Results 
Curiosity is Correlated with Uncertainty P(1 − P) and Peaks around Confidence P = 0.5 
Prior to all the analysis herein, raw curiosity ratings, ranging in value from 1 to 7, were 
normalized for each individual (subtracting each individual’s mean and dividing by each 
individual’s standard deviation). The information-gap theory predicts that curiosity 
should increase with statistical uncertainty, P(1 − P), since people who know very little 
have not had their curiosity piqued, and those who know a lot are satiated. Reported 
curiosity was indeed an inverted U-shaped function of P, reaching its maximum when P 
was around .50 (figure 2.3). Curiosity correlated positively with P(1 − P), r = .44, p < 
0.0005. Most subjects showed this relation; estimated peak curiosity was at values of P 
between .45 and .55 in three-quarters of the subjects (table 2.1).  
Further, at an individual level, most subjects show a quadratic relationship between 
curiosity and confidence level. Table 2.1 includes results from regressing fitted curiosity 
against a constant, P, and P(1 − P) and the confidence level that has the maximum 
curiosity (based on the regression estimates). Note that 12 of 19 subjects have estimated 
probabilities with maximum curiosity between .40 and .60. 
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Figure 2.3 Distribution of curiosity against confidence: The confidence scale 
ranged from 0% to 100% but was rescaled to range from 0 to 1. There was also a 
tip of the tongue (TOT) response option (Maril et al. 2001) but there were too 
few of these responses to analyze so they were excluded. All confidence ratings 
are jittered by adding a uniform random number over the interval [-0.005, 0.005] 
to convey data density. Red stars indicate mean curiosity at each confidence 
level. The solid curve line is the regression line of curiosity against confidence P 
and uncertainty P(1 − P). The estimated regression is Curiosity = -0.49 – 0.39P + 
4.77P(1 − P) + Residual curiosity. 
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Table 2.1 Individual regression analysis of normalized curiosity level against P 
and P(1 − P) 
Subject ID  Coefficients  R2  P with maximum 
curiosity Intercept  P  P(1 − P) 
1  ‐0.06  ‐1.51  4.00  0.19†  0.32 
2  ‐0.4  ‐0.32  4.16  0.13  0.47 
3  ‐0.17  ‐0.39  2.47  0.08  0.43 
4  0.26  ‐1.38  3.18  0.33**  0.29 
5  ‐0.88  0.33  4.77  0.19*  0.54 
6  ‐0.49  ‐0.41  5.24  0.30*  0.47 
7  ‐0.21  ‐1.20  6.40  0.56**  0.42 
8  0.38  ‐1.68  2.51  0.49**  0.17 
9  ‐1.73  0.74  8.25  0.44**  0.55 
10  ‐0.61  0.86  1.71  0.12  0.76 
11  ‐0.77  0.87  2.07  0.11  0.72 
12  ‐1.58  ‐0.02  9.86  0.53**  0.51 
13  0.1  ‐1.60  6.11  0.66**  0.38 
14  ‐1.14  ‐0.12  7.84  0.69**  0.50 
15  ‐0.43  ‐0.34  4.16  0.13  0.47 
16  ‐0.48  0.07  3.68  0.13  0.52 
17  ‐2.16  0.77  9.89  0.68**  0.55 
18  ‐0.92  1.07  2.40  0.12  0.73 
19  ‐0.85  ‐0.67  8.37  0.54**  0.47 
Note: Confidence ratings (0% ~ 100%) are rescaled to range from 0 to 1. 
† significant at p<0.05  
* p<0.01  
** p<0.001 
 
fMRI Results 
In this section, we first focus on brain activity when questions were initially presented 
and then discuss brain activity when answers were presented. Results are reported for 
brain areas with significant activity at an uncorrected p-value of 0.001 and cluster size 
k  5 unless noted otherwise. 
Curiosity is Correlated with Activity in Reward Regions 
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The first question-presentation epoch was associated with the high- or low- curiosity 
condition according to the individualized median curiosity level. We created a contrast 
that identified regions whose activity was greater in response to high curiosity than in 
response to low curiosity. Significantly activated regions include the left caudate; 
bilateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), including inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (figure 2.4a); and 
parahippocampal gyri (PHG) (table 2.2). Activations in the putamen (x, y, z = 21, 9, 9), 
t(18) = 3.15, and the globus pallidus (x, y, z = 12, -6, 0), t(18) = 3.94, were significant at 
a more lenient p-value of 0.005 (uncorrected), but no activation was found in the nucleus 
accumbens. The area of significant activation in the left caudate overlaps with areas of 
significant activity identified by the models using subject-normalized linear curiosity and 
residual curiosity as the regressors (figure 2.4b). This finding is consistent with the view 
of curiosity as anticipation of rewarding information.  
 
Figure 2.4 Differential brain activity in high and low curiosity trials during first 
question presentation (p<.001 uncorrected, extent threshold >5). Overlapped 
regions of activation in bilateral PFC (a) and the caudate (b) by curiosity from 
three different dependent variable models: High > Low median-split curiosity 
(red); linear in curiosity (yellow); linear in residual curiosity from the figure 2.3 
regression (green). Note that we did not find activation in OFC regions as one 
might expect, but this is not surprising because our sequence was not optimized 
to detect OFC activations. (right) Overlapped close-up of caudate activations 
from the same three different models in (b). 
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Table 2.2 Brain regions associated with high curiosity, relative to low curiosity, 
during the first question presentation 
Region     L/R*    Coordinates    Spatial Extent  t 
         x  y  z    (voxels)   
Caudate    L    ‐9  3  3    10  4.04 
IFG/BA45    L    ‐54  24  21    112  5.71 
    R    48  24  21    5  4.01 
PHG    L    ‐33  ‐39  ‐12    21  4.04 
    R    36  ‐30  ‐18    5  4.46 
Medial Frontal Gyrus    L    ‐12  36  48    26  4.49 
MFG, Pre‐motor Cortex    L    ‐27  15  57    70  5.71 
Lingual gyrus    R    18  ‐63  ‐3    11  4.57 
Cerebellum     R    36  ‐69  ‐36    34  4.67 
All locations are reported in MNI coordinates. * Laterality 
 
Curiosity is Correlated with Memory-Related Regions when Incorrectly Guessed 
Answers are Revealed 
When the answers were revealed, activations in areas linked to learning and memory 
were much stronger if the subject’s prior guess had been incorrect, rather than correct. 
Areas differentially activated when subjects guessed incorrectly included the bilateral 
putamen and left IFG (Broca’s area) (figure 2.5). 
 
Figure 2.5 Regions which are more active in response to 
answers after making incorrect guesses than to correct guesses: 
Bilateral putamen (right: x, y, z = -24,-9,6, t(18)=4.63; left: x, y, 
z = 24,-9,12, t(18)=4.77), left IFG (Broca’s area, BA 44/45). 
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Figure 2.6 Regions having activity correlated with novel information (wrong 
answers × curiosity). Left IFG (left), Left PHG (right).  
 
Table 2.3 Brain regions linearly correlated with residual curiosity during answer 
display when subjects initially guessed incorrectly 
Region  MNI Spatial Extent     T statistic
   L/R x y z (voxels)    
     
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L ‐24 ‐27 ‐6 19    4.69
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L ‐54 9 24 76    4.48
DLPFC/BA 9  L ‐51 15 30     4.23
Inferior Frontal Gyrus    L    ‐45  30  3    88    5.98 
Lingual Gyrus    L    ‐12  ‐63  ‐6    40    5.31 
Superior Temporal Gyrus    L    ‐60  ‐57  12    5    4.6 
Superior Frontal Gyrus    L    ‐21  48  12    9    4.36 
Medial Frontal Gyrus    L    ‐6  15  51    8    4.07 
Cerebellum     R     9  ‐72  ‐30     125     6.12 
 
Furthermore, curiosity level modulated the activations during the answer display. After 
an incorrect guess, left PHG and left IFG activations during the answer display were 
positively correlated with residual curiosity (figure 2.6, table 2.3). Bilateral midbrain 
regions (left: x, y, z = -12,-24,-6, t(18) = 3.37; right: x, y, z = 12,-21,-18, t(18) = 3.97) 
were also activated at p<0.005 (uncorrected), as was the hippocampus (x, y, z = -27,-33,-
6, t(18)=3.2) (not shown). The identified area in left IFG was dorsal to areas identified in 
the analyses of the question epoch (figure 2.4a) and was part of Broca’s area, which is 
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important for language comprehension (Bookheimer 2002). When subjects guessed 
correctly, residual curiosity did not correlate with any of the identified regions. 
Because memory-related regions were differentially activated in response to answers 
presented after incorrect guesses, and the activity was modulated by curiosity, we 
hypothesized that curiosity would be associated with “memory enhancement” for new 
information (in this paradigm, a correct answer is new information if it follows an 
incorrect guess). That is, we hypothesized that after guessing incorrectly, people would 
be more likely to remember the answer to a question if they were curious to know it. 
The findings from the fMRI study suggested that curiosity is anticipation of rewarding 
information and that it may enhance learning of new information. We tested these 
hypotheses in separate experiments. We first describe the experiment that tested the 
memory-enhancement hypothesis and then report the experiment that tested the reward-
anticipation hypothesis.  
2.3  Study 2: Curiosity Enhances Memory 
Experimental Design and Methods 
Participants and Task 
Sixteen Caltech students (11 males, 5 females) participated in the first task. Fifteen 
subjects returned for a follow-up memory test. Two returned within 1 week and exhibited 
too high recall rate (over 90%) and one returned in 3 weeks—the data from these three 
subjects were not used for the memory analysis reported below.  
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The experimental procedure was very similar to that for the functional imaging study, 
having a few modifications: (a) the order of questions was randomized across all 40 of 
the question trials, (b) fixation screens were removed (these were necessary in fMRI to 
allow the BOLD signal to dissipate between decision epochs, but are unnecessary in a 
behavioral study), (c) the first presentation screen time was fixed at 10 seconds of 
exposure (rather than 12~15 seconds in the fMRI study), (d) a ‘count-down’ of five 
seconds was presented onscreen immediately before the answer was displayed in order to 
attract subjects’ attention and precisely quantify their pre-answer anticipation in terms of 
pupil size, (e) since there were few tip-of-the-tongue responses in the fMRI study, the 
TOT option was removed from the confidence scale, (f) between the curiosity and the 
confidence rating screens, a “give answer” screen was presented and subjects were asked 
to state their guess out loud so that an experimenter could record it. 
Measures 
Behavioral measures in this study included those of Study 1 (curiosity and confidence 
levels, guesses) with the change that subjects’ guesses were recorded during the task (as a 
check on post-scanner over-reporting of correct guesses in Study 1, which was minor; see 
table 2.4). This study included two additional behavior measures, including pupil dilation 
response and whether the subjects recalled the correct answers in a follow-up session. 
Upon completing the (initial) task, subjects were unexpectedly asked to return within 11-
16 days for a follow-up study. Twelve returned in about 2 weeks and were used in the 
analysis. In the follow-up session, subjects were shown the same questions and asked to 
recall the correct answers (earning $0.25 for each correct answer), in addition to $15 for 
participation.  
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Pupil dilation response (PDR) was measured before and after the answer display using a 
Mobile Eyelink II eyetracker (SR Research, Osgoode, Ontario) at 250 Hz. Experiments 
were conducted and analyzed in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) using the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard 1997) and the Eyelink Toolbox (Cornelissen et al. 
2002). In regards to the pupil dilation data, blinks were treated as missing data and 
removed. We focused on the time interval from 4.8 seconds before to 4.8 seconds after 
the onset of the answer display. After normalization, we split the pupillary data collected 
over this interval into groups of high-, middle-, and low-curiosity level. The data were 
then averaged every 400 msec across subjects (figure 2.7).  
Table 2.4 Two-sample t-test of the accuracy rate of fMRI subjects’ post-scan guesses and 
Study 2 subjects’ online guesses (equal variances assumed)6  
  Study 1 
fMRI subjects 
Study 2  
Behavioral subjects 
Mean 0.31  0.27 
Variance 0.01  0.01 
Observations 19  15 
Pooled Variance 0.01 
p‐value .11 
 
 
Results 
Pupils Dilate in Response to Curiosity-Piquing Questions 
Trials were divided into three terciles based on curiosity as measured in the initial 
session. On high-curiosity trials, PDR responses ramped up 1 to 2 s before the answer 
                                                            
6 One outlier is excluded from the subject group in Study 2. The outlier subject was a visiting international 
student for the summer, who was not familiar with American cultural trivia and showed strong 
underperformance (accuracy rate = 0.075). The fMRI-behavioral group difference is slightly larger (.31 vs. 
.26) and slightly more significant if the outlier is included. 
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onset, peaked 800 ms after, and then dropped back to baseline around 2 seconds 
afterward (figure 2.7). Average PDR during anticipation (1 second before the answer 
onset) was significantly higher for high curiosity items as compared to middle curiosity 
items (p < 0.03, one-tailed t-test), and modestly different for middle as compared to low 
curiosity items (p =0.13, one-tailed t-test). When the answer appeared (0~1000 ms after 
the onset), the average PDR was significantly different among all three groups (p < .03 or 
lower, one-tailed t-test).  
 
Figure 2.7 Pupillary response. Curiosity correlates with pupil dilation before and 
just after answers are revealed. The y-axis shows individually normalized pupil 
dilation (n=16) around the time of answer display, for different levels of 
curiosity: high (above the 67th individual percentile) in blue, low (below the 33rd 
individual percentile) in red, and middle in green. The average pupil dilation in 
this time interval for each subject was normalized to 100. 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was performed to confirm the effects of 
curiosity on PDR, while controlling for individual fixed effects and a quadratic time 
trend. The regression analysis shows that an increase of one standard deviation in 
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curiosity level results in a 0.76% (standard error 0.34%) and 0.86% (0.35%) increase in 
average PDR during the anticipation and answer viewing, respectively (table 2.5).   
Table 2.5 Pupil dilation response (PDR) regressions. Regress average PDR 
(individual mean=100) with curiosity level (CURIO), controlling for individual 
fixed effects (results not shown) and a quadratic time (QUESTION) trend; 
standard errors in parentheses.  N<640 since some PDR are missing (blinks, etc.) 
 
Period of Interest         Anticipation 
(‐1~0 s) 
Answer viewing 
(0~1 s) 
Drop‐off 
(1~2 s) 
Constant  106.741** 
(1.745) 
107.941** 
(1.721) 
102.200** 
(1.607) 
CURIO  0.740
† 
(0.358) 
0.738† 
(0.354) 
0.384 
(0.329) 
confidence P  0.089
† 
(0.036) 
0.254** 
(0.036) 
0.247** 
(0.033) 
uncertainty P(1 − P)  0.0008
† 
(0.0004) 
0.0024** 
(0.0004) 
0.0027** 
(0.0004) 
QUESTION   ‐0.398** 
(0.120) 
 ‐0.433** 
(0.118) 
 ‐0.392** 
(0.110) 
QUESTION2  0.006
† 
(0.003) 
0.006† 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
N  632  639  636 
F  6.79  9.809  9.476 
F‐test p‐value  0  0  0 
R2  0.155  0.216  0.211 
 
Note: † t-test significant at p<0.05;  ** at p<0.001 
QUESTION denotes the number in which the question appeared in the temporal order to 
capture adaptation effects. Note that curiosity reliably increases PDR just before and after 
viewing the answer (second and third column results) but is insignificant in the 1-2 s after 
the answer presentation, while the effects of confidence and uncertainty persist. 
Initial Curiosity Enhances Subsequent Memory for Incorrectly Guessed Answers 
Curiosity as expressed in the initial session had a strong effect on subsequent recall of the 
answers to the questions that were initially guessed incorrectly (figure 2.8). The accuracy 
rates differed significantly between high- and middle-curiosity items; middle- and low-
curiosity items; and high- and low-curiosity items (all p’s <0.05, paired one-tailed t-
tests).  
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Figure 2.8 Percentage accuracy on the memory test for trials in which subjects 
initially guessed incorrectly. Focusing only on the answers initially guessed 
incorrectly, we divided the answers into three (high/middle/low) curiosity groups. 
Then the average accuracy rate was computed for each group across subjects, by 
dividing the number of correct recalls by the number of total answers to be 
recalled. 
 
We repeated the same procedure with the residual curiosity (as defined in Study 1). 
Average accuracy rates are 56% (5.14%) for high, 51% (5.81%) for middle, and 38% 
(6.40%) for low curiosity questions (standard error in parenthesis). The difference in 
accuracy rate between high vs. middle was in the right direction but insignificant (p=0.17, 
paired one-tailed t-test). However, the differences between middle vs. low and also 
between high vs. low were significant (p<0.04 and p<0.01, respectively, paired one-tailed 
t-tests). The result is a little bit weaker, but still consistent with the previous results. We 
also show a main effect of curiosity on recall when we repeated the analysis, including 
control variables P and P(1 − P). Consistent with the fMRI findings, these results support 
the hypothesis that curiosity activates memory regions differentially in response to 
surprising (incorrectly guessed) answers, resulting in greater accuracy of subsequent 
recall of the correct answers. 
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OLS and logistic regression analyses were also performed to confirm the effects of 
curiosity on memory enhancement. The dependent variable, correct recall in the memory 
test (coded as 1 for a correct recall and 0 for an incorrect recall), was regressed on 
curiosity level interacting with two dummy variables that indicate whether subjects 
initially guessed the answer correctly or not. The regression analyses also find consistent 
evidence that curiosity modulates the later recall rate for answers to questions that 
subjects initially guessed incorrectly (table 2.6).  
Table 2.6 Memory test regressions: correct recall (1 = recalled the correct answer 
in memory test, 0 = otherwise) was regressed on confidence P, uncertainty P(1 − 
P), initial correctness(INI-CORRECT, 1 = initially guessed correctly, 0 = 
otherwise), initial ‘incorrectness’(INI-WRONG, 1 = initially guess incorrectly, 0 
= otherwise), and curiosity level interacting with initial correctness (CURIO*INI-
CORRECT, CURIO*INI-WRONG, respectively), controlling for individual 
fixed effects (fixed effect results not shown). 
Regression Method             OLS   (s. e.) 
OLS  
(s. e.) 
OLS  
(s. e.) 
Logit 
 (s. e.) 
Logit      (s. 
e.) 
Constant (Last subject)  0.362** 
(0.075) 
0.362** 
(0.075) 
0.386** 
(0.070) 
‐0.788†   
(0.371) 
‐0.752†   
(0.375) 
CONFIDENCE P  0.474** 
(0.072) 
0.478** 
(0.087) 
0.127 
(0.091) 
2.686** 
(0.444) 
3.142** 
(0.676) 
UNCERTAINTY P(I‐P)  ‐  ‐0.017      
(0.257) 
‐0.083      
(0.240)  ‐ 
‐1.573     
(1.624) 
INI‐CORRECT(‡)  ‐  ‐  0.452**      
(0.052)  ‐  ‐ 
CURIO*INI‐CORRECT  0.033       
(0.040) 
0.034       
(0.042) 
0.035       
(0.039) 
0.104      
(0.232) 
0.166      
(0.247) 
CURIO*INI‐WRONG  0.072* 
(0.024) 
0.072* 
(0.024) 
0.078** 
(0.022) 
0.345*  
(0.120) 
0.350*  
(0.120) 
N  520  520  520  520  520 
F–statistic/ LR  6.952 6.505 11.540 99.763  100.735
F‐statistic/LR‐test p‐value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
R2  0.147 0.145 0.257 0.187  0.189
Note: † t-test significant at p<0.05; * p<0.01;** p<0.001. 
(‡) Logit analysis including initial correctness could not be performed due to 
multicollinearity. 
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2.4  Study 3: Curiosity as Reward Anticipation 
Experimental Design and Methods 
Participants 
Participants in Study 3 were assigned to one of two conditions: a token condition 
(10 Caltech students, mean age = 23.4±3.3 years, 5 males, 5 females) and a time 
condition (20 Caltech students, mean age = 19.9±2.2 years; 12 males, 8 females). 
Initially, 21 subjects participated in the time condition, but one subject was excluded for 
further analysis because his data showed that he was not engaged in the task—first, he 
did not take enough time to comprehend a question (evidenced by the fact that he spent 
only 2.1 seconds, which is only a third of the time that other 20 subjects spent reading a 
question on average) and second, his curiosity and confidence ratings were highly 
correlated with anchor ratings (70% and 65%, respectively)7, which means that he 
submitted anchor ratings instead of his own. Informed consent was obtained using a 
consent form approved by the internal review board at Caltech. 
Task and Measures 
The task and timeline were similar to the previous experiments except for two 
modifications (figure 2.9). First, in this experiment, subjects had to spend scarce 
resources—either an experimental token or waiting time—to learn answers. Second, 10 
questions were added to the original 40 questions.8 
                                                            
7 At the start of each rating screen, a computer randomly selected an initial rating which a subject started 
toggling buttons from. We call this starting-point rating an anchor rating. 
8 We were concerned that in the token condition some subjects might spend their tokens too quickly or too 
slowly, so that they would have either none left or many left before the last few questions. If so, their token 
choices in those later trials would not reflect their true desire for information. We therefore added 10 new 
questions at the end as padding and excluded them from the analysis, using only the same 40 questions 
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Figure 2.9 Timeline of Experiment in Study 3. Subjects read a question, rate 
curiosity and confidence level about the answer and type their guess. Then 
subjects can either spend a token (in the token condition) or wait for a certain 
amount of time (in the time condition) to see the answer if they wish. If they do 
not wish to see the answer, they can quickly move on to the next question.  
 
A reward is an object or event that elicits approach and is worked for (Wise 2004). 
Requiring subjects to spend tokens or time measured their willingness to pay for 
information they were curious about and to evaluate curiosity-provoking information as a 
reward. The different conditions tested the robustness of the effect of curiosity to change 
in the type of resource that was spent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
used in the previous studies (including the last 10 questions does not change the result, however). Indeed, 
three of 10 subjects spent all their tokens and one of 10 subjects had more than sufficient tokens to see all 
10 answers left by the time the last 10 padding questions started. There is no budgeting problem in the time 
condition, so all 50 questions were included in the analysis. 
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In the token condition, subjects had to spend 1 of their 25 experimental tokens to find out 
the answer to a question. Subjects read each question, reported their curiosity and 
confidence levels, and typed their guess. After guessing, they could pay 1 token to see the 
answer immediately. The tokens did not have cash value, but since there were 25 tokens 
and 50 questions, spending a token on an answer meant skipping another answer, or a lost 
opportunity to see another answer (an opportunity cost). Given the previous finding in 
Study 1 that high curiosity was correlated with activity in the striatal region, we 
hypothesized that when subjects were more curious, they would anticipate higher reward 
from learning information, so they would be more likely to spend a token. Other results 
were possible, however. Subjects could allocate tokens on the basis of their confidence in 
their guesses (to find out answers they are confident they know, or confident they do not 
know), impatiently use all their tokens in the beginning, alternate spending and saving, or 
exhibit some other pattern unrelated to curiosity. Any of these other token-spending 
patterns would be inconsistent with the reward anticipation hypothesis. 
The second condition imposed a different cost: after guessing, if subjects wanted to see 
the answer, they had to wait until it appeared. They were told that the waiting time would 
vary randomly from trial to trial and that any amount of time from 5 to 25 s would be 
equally likely. Subjects could quit waiting and skip to the next question at any time; in 
this case, they would not get to see the correct answer. We hypothesized that subjects 
would be more likely to spend time, to wait longer, for the answers that they were more 
curious about.  
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Results 
Logistic regressions showed that spending tokens or spending time were both strongly 
correlated (p<0.001) with curiosity (figure 2.10, table 2.7 and 2.8). The significance did 
not change when P and P(1 − P) were included, or when residual curiosity was used.  
 
Figure 2.10 Curiosity correlates with willingness to pay the cost. Group logit 
curves relating normalized curiosity to the probability of spending a token 
(blue) or waiting time (red) to learn the answer to a trivia question. Logistic 
regression analyses were performed to test whether curiosity is correlated 
with spending tokens or time. For each condition, we pooled the data across 
subjects. CI=confidence interval. 
 
Table 2.7 Group-level random-effects logistic regression of curiosity on decision 
to spend a token 
Prob (spend a point)  Coefficient  S.E.  z  P>|z|  95% Confidence Interval 
normalized curiosity  1.96  0.18  10.96  0.000  1.61  2.31 
constant  0.21  0.14  1.56  0.12  ‐0.05  0.48 
Note: The dependent variable, decision to spend a token, was regressed on a subject-normalized curiosity 
rating and a constant. The dependent variable was coded as 1 if a subject spent a point and 0 
otherwise. 
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Table 2.8 Group-level random-effects logistic regression of curiosity on decision 
to wait for an answer 
 
Prob (wait)  Coefficient  S.E.  z  P>|z|  95% Confidence Interval 
normalized curiosity  1.88  0.13  14.47  0.000  1.63  2.14 
constant  0.31  0.16  1.89  0.06  ‐0.01  0.63 
Note: The dependent variable, decision to wait for the answer, was regressed on a subject-normalized 
curiosity rating and a constant. The dependent variable was coded as 1 if a subject waited and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Table 2.9 reports the results of individual logistic regressions for the effect of normalized 
curiosity on the decision to spend a token or time. At an individual-subject level, 
correlations between curiosity and spending were significant at p<.01 for most of the 
subjects. Figure 2.11 and 2.12 show the individually fitted probabilities of spending a 
token or time as a function of the normalized curiosity ratings, using the coefficients 
reported in table 2.9. Subjects waited for an additional 3.7 seconds as their normalized 
curiosity level increased by one standardized unit. In summary, for most of the subjects, 
curiosity is the strongest predictor of whether a subject will spend tokens or time to see 
the answer to a question. 
Table 2.9 Summary of individual logistic regressions of the normalized curiosity 
on decision to spend cost 
(a) Token condition 
Subject ID 
Coeff. for 
norm. curiosity  z‐stat  p‐value  pseudo‐R2 
1  1.33  3.14  0.002  0.23 
2  1.02  2.55  0.011  0.15 
3  2.09  3.19  0.001  0.36 
4  1.08  2.57  0.010  0.16 
5  2.18  3.86  0.001  0.49 
6  1.92  2.86  0.004  0.31 
7  4.42  2.61  0.009  0.72 
8  2.64  3.27  0.001  0.47 
9  2.69  3.52  0.001  0.54 
Note: (1) The coefficient for an implicit constant term is not reported here. 
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(2) For subject 10, the normalized curiosity level of -.524 predicts data 
perfectly—that is, the probability of waiting jumps at -.524 from 0 to 1. 
(3) The coefficient for an implicit constant term is not reported here. 
 
(b) Time condition  
Subject ID 
Coeff. for 
norm. curiosity  z‐stat  p‐value  pseudo‐R2 
1  1.13  2.97  0.003  0.18 
2  3.70  3.26  0.001  0.63 
3  1.01  2.78  0.005  0.14 
4  1.55  3.54  0.000  0.28 
5  2.69  3.88  0.000  0.52 
6  1.46  3.19  0.001  0.23 
7  2.49  3.79  0.000  0.47 
8  3.81  3.55  0.000  0.70 
9  1.17  1.75  0.08  0.14 
10  1.60  3.81  0.000  0.31 
11  1.28  2.74  0.006  0.36 
12  2.90  1.41  0.158  0.26 
13  1.39  3.66  0.000  0.26 
14  2.27  3.69  0.000  0.43 
15   3.24  3.29  0.001  0.56 
16  2.08  3.76  0.000  0.42 
17  2.36  1.92  0.055  0.44 
18  1.61  2.88  0.004  0.33 
Note: (1) For subject 19, the normalized curiosity level of -.232 predicts data 
perfectly—that is, the probability of waiting jumps at -.232 from 0 to 1.  
(2) For subject 20, the normalized curiosity level of -1.921 predicts data 
perfectly. 
(3) The coefficient for an implicit constant term is not reported here. 
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Figure 2.11 Individual choice probability curves in the token condition. Token-
spending behavior depends on curiosity level. This pattern does not change when 
P and P(1 − P) are also included in the model.  Y-axis: probability of spending a 
token. 
 
 
Figure 2.12 Individual choice probability logistic curves in the time condition. 
The decision to wait depends on curiosity level. For most of the subjects, this 
does not change when P and P(1 − P) are also included in the model.  Y-axis: 
probability of waiting for the answer. 
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2.5  Discussion and Conclusions 
Curiosity was considered an important drive by psychologists of a century ago, but 
research on it subsequently waned (Loewenstein 1994). This study was an attempt to 
revive interest in curiosity; measuring it by self-report, and using fMRI to study neural 
correlates of reported curiosity. The findings suggest hypotheses about memory and 
reward anticipation.  
The correlations between reported curiosity and both lateral PFC and caudate activity are 
consistent with hypotheses that curiosity is linked to anticipation of information, and that 
information is a secondary reinforcer. Curiosity was correlated with activity in the 
caudate when a question was first presented. It is well established that the caudate is 
involved in reward anticipation and reward learning, across a wide variety of primary and 
secondary reinforcers (Delgado et al. 2003; Delgado et al. 2000), including social 
rewards such as benevolent reciprocity (Fehr & Camerer 2007; King-Casas et al. 2005), 
social cooperation (Rilling et al. 2002), altruistic punishment (De Quervain et al. 2004) 
and winning an auction (Delgado et al. 2008).   
Previous studies have found that the expectation of feedback is sufficient for activation of 
the caudate (Aron et al. 2004). Our experimental design included feedback in the form of 
the correct answers presented to the subjects. If there is brain activity in anticipation of 
positive feedback, it should be modulated by the confidence level P (the more confident 
one is in being right, the more positive feedback one expects). The parametric design of 
the analysis, by correlating activity with curiosity levels and then with residual curiosity, 
precludes the possibility that the caudate activation was driven solely by expectation of 
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feedback from accurate guesses because residual curiosity and confidence are 
uncorrelated by construction. The finding that activity in the left PFC is correlated with 
curiosity is also consistent with the idea that curiosity is associated with an intrinsic value 
of learning, because neurons in the left PFC receive input from neurons in the substantia 
nigra via the dorsal striatum. The dorsal striatum responds to magnitude of primary 
rewards and reward prediction (Leon & Shadlen 1999; Rogers et al. 1999) and shows 
sustained phasic activations during reward expectation (Watanabe 1996) 
There are also studies that have reported striatal activations in response to negatively 
valenced stimuli (Knutson et al. 2001) or during nonreward activity such as working 
memory and motor preparation (Cairo et al. 2004; Simon et al. 2002). Since our task did 
involve working memory and motor preparation, the striatal activation we found could 
have been due to increased attention, incentive salience, or other activities (as some 
studies suggest). Given that people tend to be more attentive to an object that is more 
rewarding, the fMRI evidence alone cannot rule out these interpretations from reward-
anticipation interpretation.  
Therefore, the reward anticipation interpretation was investigated further in a separate 
behavioral study. In Study 3, subjects were allowed to either spend a token or to wait to 
see the answer to a question. Both actions incurred a cost—a lost opportunity or lost time. 
People are generally willing to spend time and resources to obtain objects that they find 
rewarding. Thus, enhanced willingness to spend resources to find out the answers to more 
curiosity-provoking questions is consistent with the reward interpretation hypothesis and 
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not with the idea that the fMRI results indicate only effects of attention or incentive 
salience. 
Recent computational neural network models suggest another compatible interpretation 
involving memory (Frank et al. 2001; O'Reilly & Frank 2006). Question stimuli trigger 
differing levels of curiosity, and the basal ganglia sends out a stronger signal to enable 
the lateral PFC to update, maintain, and internally represent questions eliciting higher 
curiosity, whose answer may be anticipated to be more rewarding. This internal 
representation in the lateral PFC, particularly in the left IFG, is a crucial component of 
long-term memory consolidation and is critical in the learning of new information (Paller 
& Wagner 2002). 
The PHG and left IFG were activated in response to incorrect guesses, and the level of 
activation was correlated with the level of curiosity. These regions are thought to be 
involved in successful verbal memory encoding (Brewer et al. 1998; Paller & Wagner 
2002; Wagner et al. 1998). In conjunction with the caudate and left PFC activations when 
questions were first presented, this activity suggests that curiosity strengthens memory of 
correct answers when subjects were initially wrong—that is, that curiosity is linked to the 
reward value of information and also enhances learning from new information.  
This conjecture led to Study 2, in which we measured PDR and memory. Because pupil 
dilation is known to be linked to arousal, attention, interest, cognitive effort (Beatty 1982; 
Hess & Polt 1960; Kahneman 1973) and more efficient verbal learning (Kahneman & 
Peavler 1969), and because anticipatory pupillary responses increase following a stimulus 
that predicts rewards (O’Doherty et al. 2003), the observed correlation of curiosity with 
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pupil dilation is consistent with both reward anticipation and learning of novel 
information. The finding that curiosity enhanced later recall of novel information 
suggests that curiosity helps to consolidate novel information in memory. Having 
established that curiosity is a form of reward anticipation, we can also tie this research to 
the work of Adcock and her collegues (Adcock et al. 2006), who showed that anticipated 
monetary rewards modulate activations in the mesolimbic and parahippocampal regions 
and promotes memory formation prior to learning. Our results complement theirs by 
showing that endogeneous internal motivation manifested in curiosity recruits neural 
circuits similar to those that are recruited by exogenous incentives, and has a similar 
effect on learning. 
We also found bilateral putamen activation during the answer display after incorrect 
guesses. Although no explicit reward or punishment was involved, subjects might have 
perceived guessing incorrectly as an unexpected inherent, or self-punishment and the 
severity of this punishment might have been based on confidence in the answer (e.g., 
subjects would have felt worse about an incorrect guess if they had been very confidence 
about that guess than if they had not been confident). The differential putamen activations 
we found might reflect this “internal punishment” aspect of guessing incorrectly. This 
interpretation is consistent with the recent finding that unexpected punishments and 
unexpected rewards produce very similar BOLD responses in the putamen at the time of 
outcomes (Knutson et al. 2000; Seymour et al. 2007).  
The exploratory nature of our study does not allow us to examine all possible aspects of 
curiosity separately. It is certainly likely that curiosity works differently in different 
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sensory and knowledge domains. The trivia questions we used evoke what is often called 
“specific epistemic curiosity” (Berlyne 1954). This kind of curiosity is the desire for a 
particular piece of information and is often associated with motivations for academic 
achievement and scientific discovery. This type of curiosity is probably different from the 
sensation driven by stimulus novelty or the desire to avoid boredom or sensory 
deprivation. The latter type of curiosity is called diversive perceptual curiosity and can be 
found in various animals (Berlyne 1954). The curiosity we measured includes a desire to 
learn new information and anticipation of the rewarding information to be learned 
(because subjects received feedback). A study without feedback would isolate pure 
curiosity absent anticipation and learning, though it would not permit study of the 
response to correct and incorrect guesses. Further studies could also show whether 
curiosity is different for visual stimuli, semantic narratives (e.g., page-turner novels), 
social information (e.g., gossip), and subjects of  “morbid curiosity.”  
Understanding the neural basis of curiosity has important substantive implications. Note 
that although information seeking is generally evolutionarily adaptive (Panksepp 1998), 
modern technologies magnify the amount of information available, and hence the 
potential effects of curiosity. Understanding curiosity is important for selecting and 
motivating knowledge workers who gather information (e.g., scientists, detectives, and 
journalists). The production of engaging news, advertising and entertainment is also, to 
some extent, an attempt to create curiosity. The fact that curiosity increases with 
uncertainty (up to a point) suggests that a small amount of knowledge can pique curiosity 
and prime the hunger for knowledge, much as an olfactory or visual stimulus can prime a 
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hunger for food; this observation might suggest ways for educators to ignite the wick in 
the candle of learning. 
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2.6  Appendix for Chapter 2 
2.6.1  Questions, Answers, and Average Curiosity Ratings 
 
The order of presentation of questions was randomized within each individual run. 
 
Question  
(Answer, Average curiosity rating across subject) 
Run 1 
What rock and roll band performs "I want to Rock and Roll All Night"?  
(Kiss, 3.84) 
What unfortunate handicap did Thomas Edison suffer from?  
(Deafness, 4.63) 
What city was "Groundhog Day," starring Bill Murray, filmed in?  
(Pittsburgh, 3.53) 
What book is the most shoplifted book in the world?  
(The Bible, 5.05) 
What is the museum-surrounded space in Washington DC called?  
(The Mall, 3.89) 
How long were Jerry Seinfeld and his pals sentenced in the series finale?  
(One year, 2.37) 
What is the only type of animal besides a human that can get a sunburn?  
(Pig, 5.42) 
Which school has the most students over age 25 according to US News?  
(University of Phoenix, 3.74) 
What snack food is an ingredient in the explosive dynamite?  
(Peanuts, 5.63) 
What is the most sober school according to The Princeton Review?  
(Brigham Young University, 5.10) 
Run 2 
What city is referred to as "Pittsburgh of the South"?  
(Birmingham, AL, 3.83) 
What invention should make Ts'ai Lun, a 2nd century inventor, a household name?  
(Paper, 5) 
What breed of dog is the only animal whose evidence is admissible in American courts?  
(Bloodhound, 4.94) 
What animal can shed up to 30,000 teeth in its lifetime?  
(Shark, 4.33) 
Who was the first host of the comedy show Saturday Night Live?  
(George Carlin, 3.5) 
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What is the only country in the world where women dominate the government? * 
(Belgium, 5.89) 
What type of political campaign is characterized by many stops in small towns?  
(Whistle-stop campaign, 3.89) 
What instrument was invented to sound like a human singing?  
(Violin, 5.72) 
From what city in the United States did Coca-Cola originate?  
(Atlanta, GA, 3.78) 
What animal's excrements are consumed as luxury food?  
(Bats, 4.83) 
Run 3 
What everyday food will make a drug test show up positive?  
(Poppy seeds, 3.61) 
What industry uses 20% of China's harvested plants?  
(Medicine, 4.72) 
What electronic item is stolen most often on the NYC subways? *  
(iPods, 4.11) 
What famous person was Dolly the cloned sheep named after?  
(Dolly Parton, 3.33) 
What fictional character in Treasure Island lends its name to a fast food chain?  
(Long John Silver, 4.11) 
What is the name of the galaxy that Earth is a part of?  
(Milky Way, 2.28) 
What is the most abundant mineral in the human body?  
(Calcium, 5.11) 
What president has three 'A's in his first name where each has a different sound?  
(Abraham Lincoln, 3.39) 
What title was Catherine of Aragon known by after she divorced Henry VIII?  
(Dowager Princess of Wales, 4.44) 
What country has won the most Miss World beauty contests? * 
(Venezuela, 3.89) 
Run 4 
What is the only country in the world that has a bill of rights for cows?  
(India, 3.47) 
What was the first animated film to win an Academy Award?  
(Beauty and the Beast, 4.37) 
What item on the McDonald's menu has the most calories? * 
(Chicken Selects, 20 Piece, 4.84) 
What city has the only drive-thru post office in the world?  
(Chicago, 4.26) 
What crime is punishable if attempted, but not if committed?  
(Suicide, 4) 
What secular philosopher's teaching influenced life in his country for 2000 years?  
(Confucius, 4.63) 
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What Beatles song lasted the longest on the American charts?  
(Hey Jude, 5) 
What is the only type of lizard that has a voice?  
(Gecko, 4.47) 
Which sports athlete has appeared in McDonald's, Nike and Hanes advertisements?  
(Michael Jordan, 2.89) 
What was put in place by the Greeks before and during all the Ancient Olympic 
festivals?  
(A truce, 4.47) 
 
Note: The questions in asterisk (*) are updated or replaced by the following set: 
 
What male body part did Mademoiselle magazine find to be 
the favorite of most women? 
Eyes 
What part of a woman's body were ancient Chinese artists 
forbidden to paint? 
Her foot 
What creature proved to be much faster than a horse in a 1927 
race in Sydney, Australia? 
The Kangaroo 
What item on the McDonald's menu has the most calories? Chocolate Triple Thick Shake 
(32 fl oz cup), 1160 kcal 
 
Additional Questions and answers used in Experiment 3. 
 
Questions Answer 
What did the girls in medieval Spain put in their mouths to avoid unwanted 
kisses? 
Toothpicks 
What drupaceous fruit were Hawaiian women once forbidden by law to eat? The coconut 
In parts of India, the oldest brother must marry first. If he cannot find a 
wife, what can he choose to marry? 
A tree 
How many years are in an eon (aeon)? 100 million 
What fat substitute got FDA approval for use in snack foods, despite reports 
of diarrhea and cramps? 
Olestra 
What organ is found only in vertebrates (animals with a backbone)? Liver 
In 1875, who helped Daniel Peter invent "milk" chocolate? Henry Nestle 
What butterfly-shaped gland is located just in front of the windpipe? The Thyroid 
What is a shark’s skeleton made of? Cartilage 
Who was the first Christian emperor of Rome? Constantine the 
Great 
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2.6.2  Instructions for Study 1 
 
Instructions 
 
Thank you for participating in this study on curiosity. During the experiment you 
will be asked a series of different trivia-type questions about things that you may or may 
not find yourself curious about. After presenting each question, we will ask you to rate 
(1) how curious you are to know the answer, and (2) how confident you are that you 
know the answer. The answer to the question will be revealed before you move on to the 
next question.  
 
The questions are presented in a pre-programmed pace. So please wait for the 
next rating slide after you complete the task in the question slide. You will be given only 
12 to 15 seconds to read each question. No matter how quickly you figure out the answer, 
the program will not let you continue until the full 12 to 15 seconds are up. The program 
will automatically move on to the next step when 12 to 15 seconds are over. Please 
respond quickly, but please do not speak/think aloud.  
 
Here is the sample of a question. 
 
 
 
 
After a question is presented, a screen with a sliding scale from 1 (not at all 
curious) through 7 (very curious) will appear (see below for the sample). Select the 
number that represents how curious you are about the answer. When rating curiosity, use 
the right (1) and left (3) buttons to scroll along the response scale. To confirm your 
choice, press the top (4) button.  
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After making your selection, you will be asked to rate how confident you are of 
the answer or whether the answer is on the tip of the tongue (see below for the sample 
screen). You may respond with a sliding scale from 0% (not at all confident) through 
100% (very confident) or the tip of the tongue (TOT) option. The ‘tip-of-the-tongue’ 
response indicates that you feel that you know the correct answer, even though you 
cannot remember the exact word that corresponds with the answer at the moment. If you 
feel that the correct answer is on the tip-of-your-tongue, please select “TOT” response. 
Before selecting your option, please silently say the word to see if you actually produce 
it. You may use the 1 (right) and 3 (left) buttons to scroll along the response scale. The 
rating steps are self-paced, so the program will not move on to the next step until you 
press the 4 (top) button to confirm your selection. 
 
 
 
 
The fixation screen will appear between and after the rating slides and then the 
answer slide will follow. 
 
Here are the fixation screen (left) and the answer slide (right). 
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Before you move on to the next question, the fixation screen will appear again. 
 
 Before the experiment starts, you will be presented with 3 practice questions. 
After you answer and rate them, we will ask if you have any questions. At the end of the 
experiment, you will be asked to debrief whether your guess was right or not and to fill 
out a short questionnaire. You will be paid $20 for participating in this experiment. The 
information we obtain from the experiment will not be used for other commercial or non-
academic purposes. 
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Chapter 3 
Hypothetical and Real Consumer Choices Differentially 
Activate Common Frontostriatal Brain Circuitry 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the study of choices people and groups make, the canonical choice of most interest is a 
real choice—a binding commitment to a course of action, like buying a house or casting a 
vote. However, many of the data collected to understand determinants of real choices are 
actually hypothetical statements about likely or future choices (they are guesses, plans, 
but not real choices). 
The reliance on hypothetical choice data presumes that hypothetical choices are 
quantitatively similar to actual choices, and involve the same neural processes that lead to 
real choices. But saying “We should get married!” is not the same as saying “I do” 
(which is a legally binding real choice). Indeed, many studies in economics have found 
that hypothetical valuations of goods reflect a systematic “yes bias” compared to real 
valuations: i.e., hypothetical intentions to buy are overstated relative to real intentions 
(Blumenschein et al. 2007; Cummings et al. 1995; Johannesson et al. 1998; List 2001; 
List & Shogren 1998; Little & Berrens 2004; Murphy et al. 2005). This hypothetical bias 
has also been demonstrated in statements of intent to vote (Keeter & Samaranayake 
2007) and to undertake a plan of action, which subjects later do not take (Ariely & 
Wertenbroch 2002; O’Donoghue & Rabin 2008; Tanner & Carlson 2009).    
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These empirical phenomena raise a question:  Are different neural computations carried 
out in the brain for hypothetical and real decisions? This question is important for the 
cognitive neuroscience of choice. Answering it may provide tools to more accurately 
predict real choices from hypothetical choice data.  
One possibility is that hypothetical and real decisions are differently processed in the 
brain and recruit different neural systems. Real choices are typically precise, immediate, 
have higher stakes, and are often more emotionally charged. Hypothetical choices might 
be rapid and mindless, requiring fewer cognitive resources. This hypothesis predicts no 
necessary functional overlap in the two types of choices.  
Another possibility is that while real and hypothetical decisions share a common neural 
circuitry, additional activities are dedicated to each type of decision. For example, 
hypothetical decisions might be evaluated by forecasting a possible real choice, which 
requires probabilistic reasoning, anticipation of the future and simulation of available 
choice scenarios, recruiting a wider neural network. Alternatively, a decision in a 
hypothetical situation could be evaluated in isolation, since the hypothetical choice will 
not have any consequences. In contrast, a real decision requires thorough consideration of 
possible consequences, comparisons between alternative options and integration of 
opportunity costs—the foregone utility from the alternatives, into a valuation process. 
This hypothesis predicts additional activations special to real and hypothetical choices. 
The results of this study clearly support the latter possibility. There is substantial overlap 
in neural circuitry during hypothetical and real choices, however the magnitude of 
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activity is greater in real decisions and there are additional activations during real 
choices.  
In our study, 24 human subjects were scanned using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) while they made hypothetical and real purchase decisions regarding 
consumer products that are encountered in their daily lives. Subjects reported their 
willingness to pay (WTP) for 200 consumer products before scanning (figure 3.1 and 
3.2). WTP is the maximum amount of money that an individual would be willing to 
spend to purchase the item (Hare et al. 2008; Plassmann et al. 2007). The median WTP 
was used to set a constant price for the scanning session; this price is different for each 
subject. In the scanner, subjects made binary (Yes or No) decisions about purchasing 
products at the constant price, and also expressed Strong or Weak preference (i.e., 
strong/weak yes or strong/weak no). The first block of 50 decisions was hypothetical. 
The second block of 50 decisions was based on different products (different from the first 
block, but still part of the original 200), and these decisions were unexpectedly real (i.e., 
an agreement to buy could be enforced by taking money from their initial payment for 
participation and giving them the purchased good—this will be explained further) (figure 
3.3). After the scanning, they were then shown the same products that had been presented 
in the hypothetical trials (also unexpectedly) and they then made real (binding) purchase 
decisions for those products. 
Previous studies have found that the brain encodes goal values and decision values during 
everyday economic decision-making scenarios (Hare et al. 2008; Knutson et al. 2007; 
Plassmann et al. 2007). A goal value is the value of a choice object. A decision value is 
any quantity that reflects the net benefit of making a decision to reach the goal, and can 
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typically be linked to observed choice probabilities. The key decision value (DV) in the 
current study is “consumer surplus,” the maximum WTP for an item minus the price of 
the item, an economic measure of the net benefit of the decision. The specific goals of 
this study are to investigate differences in the brain regions used during hypothetical and 
real decision making, and to study differences in how the decision value is encoded in 
both types of decision making. 
3.2 fMRI Study 
Experimental Design and Methods 
Participants 
Male subjects were recruited from Caltech and the neighboring community in the fMRI 
study, (N=24; mean  st. dev. age = 20.9  6.1 year; age range = 17–47). Seven 
additional subjects participated in the experiment. Four were excluded from the analysis 
because they reported, during a debriefing, misunderstanding the instructions of the 
second fMRI part (real choice) which compromised internal validity. Three subjects were 
excluded because modification of decision value to fit choices was not reliable. All 
subjects were right handed and healthy; had no history of psychiatric diagnoses, or 
neurological or metabolic illnesses; had normal or corrected-to-normal vision; and were 
not taking medications that interfere with the performance of fMRI. Subjects were 
informed about the experiment and gave written consent upon arrival at the laboratory. 
The institutional review board of Caltech (Pasadena, CA) approved the study.  
Stimuli 
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Two hundred consumer products were selected from various categories appealing to 
males (e.g., MP3 players, DVDs; for the complete product list, see table A3.1) in order to 
generate balanced purchase decisions across different individual preferences. The retail 
price of the products ranged from $20 to $100. Approximately 300 products were initially 
collected by the experimenters and about 100 of the most unpopular items were screened 
out by a pilot study, leaving 200 products used in the study. The products were presented 
to the subjects using high-resolution color pictures (72 dpi). The stimulus presentation 
and response recording was controlled by E-prime (Psychology Software Tools). Inside 
the scanner, the visual stimuli were presented using video goggles. 
 
Figure 3.1 Timeline of the entire experiment. 
Experimental Procedure and Task 
At the start of the experiment, subjects were informed that they would receive a $60 
participation fee upon the completion of the experiment. The experiment consisted of 
three parts—pre-scanning, scanning and post-scanning (figure 3.1). The scanning part 
itself had 2 decision-making tasks—one hypothetical and the other real. Subjects were 
only informed that there were 3 decision-making parts, and the detailed instructions for 
each part were not given until each part began.  
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In the pre-scanning part, subjects were shown images of 200 consumer products one at a 
time and asked to state WTP for each item in US dollars. Subjects learned that their 
reporting of the WTPs was a hypothetical exercise, and thus they were not bound to pay 
whatever they reported. When evaluating items, they were instructed to note the 
following points. First, the value of each item should be rated independently from the 
others, as if it were the only item. Second, the products should be evaluated from the 
subject’s own perspective, not that of someone else. That is, the subjects should not 
consider an item for the purposes of resale or gifting to someone else. Third, the current 
ownership of a particular item might affect the rating of the item. For example, if they 
already own item X, their rating of item X might be high or low depending on whether 
they want a second one for himself or not. Products were presented in random order. In 
each trial, subjects were allowed to enter an amount between $0 to $50 using a sliding 
scale with a $1 increment (figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2 An example screen for the pre-scanning trials. 
Each trial started with a 1-second-duration fixation cross and ended as soon as the subject 
entered their WTP, with the next trial beginning immediately. Upon completion of the 
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first part, the computer ranked products in a descending order of the subject’s reported 
WTPs and then paired up each two adjacent products ({1st, 2nd}, {3rd, 4th}, …, {199th, 
200th}). Then among 100 pairs it selected 50 pairs (the 17 pairs with the highest WTP, the 
16 pairs with the medium WTP and the 17 pairs with the lowest WTP) and randomly 
chose one product of each pair and assigned it to the hypothetical decision-making block 
and the other to the real decision making block. This pre-selection ensured that the 
distributions of WTP in both blocks were comparable (see figure 3.4 in Results) and 
there were no repeated appearances of the same product in both blocks. The median WTP 
of the 200 items was determined as the price for the scanning part (table A3.2). This 
median price scheme ensured participants made a sufficient number of purchase 
decisions for statistical power (see figure 3.5 in results).  
In the scanning part, subjects went through two types of purchase decision-making tasks 
having identical structure. Both tasks were the same except that the first block of 
decisions was hypothetical and the second was real, which is a crucial difference for this 
study. In each block, subjects went through 50 trials, and in each trial they were offered 
the chance to buy the product shown at a fixed price, which was determined by the 
median WTP from the first part. Fifty products for each block were pre-selected in the 
same way as described above; these products were then presented in random order within 
the block.  
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Figure 3.3 Time structure of an individual trial in the scanning part. The 
structure of the hypothetical and real trials was identical. There was no repetition 
of a product between the hypothetical and real trials and subjects were asked to 
specify their decision (‘Yes’ or ‘No’) as well as the confidence level (‘Strong’ or 
‘Weak’) in the decision.  
 
Figure 3.3 describes the time structure of each trial in the scanning part. Following the 
fixation cross, which lasted for 1 to 8 seconds, subjects were shown a consumer product 
image with the price below for up to 6 seconds. During the 6 seconds of image 
presentation they were asked to indicate when they had reached a decision by pressing 
any button. Either by this first button press or after 6 seconds had passed, the subjects 
proceeded to the next fixation screen, and then submitted their decision. The subjects 
were given up to 4 seconds to respond. When submitting a decision, subjects were 
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instructed to specify their level of confidence in the decision as well, resulting in 4 
different response types—strong yes, weak yes, weak no, and strong no. Once a decision 
was entered, the selected response type flashed to confirm the submission and the 
subsequent trial began immediately. Subjects were given two button boxes, each of which 
had two buttons and was held by each hand. Buttons assigned to each response were 
counterbalanced across blocks and subjects.  
In the hypothetical trials, the decisions made were purely hypothetical and did not count. 
However, in the real trials, subjects learned that one of the 50 trials in this block would be 
chosen at random and whatever decision they had made in the chosen trial would be 
implemented whether it be ‘buy’ or ‘not buy.’ The subjects were further informed that if 
the decision was made to ‘buy’, then the price of the item would be subtracted from their 
$60 participation fee, and they would receive the item as well as the remaining fee. Since 
only one trial counted as real, subjects did not have to worry about spreading a budget 
over the different items and they could treat each trial as if it were the only decision that 
counted; indeed, they were instructed to act as such. As in the pre-scanning part, subjects 
were instructed to evaluate each item for their own use and to make every decision 
independently of the others.  
Upon finishing the fMRI part, subjects were asked to complete another task outside the 
scanner—a ‘surprise’ real block of decisions. The procedure was the same as in the 
scanning part except for shortened durations of the fixation screens (each of 500 ms 
now). The same 50 items presented in the hypothetical trials were shown again. This 
time, subjects were asked to make a real decision on these items. They were informed 
that exactly one trial out of the total of 100 real trials – 50 from the real trials and 50 from 
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this surprise real part—would be randomly selected and implemented based on their 
decision made in the selected trial. The purpose of this post-scanning part was to keep 
track of switches in hypothetical decisions for the matched set of items.  
fMRI Data Acquisition 
fMRI data were acquired on a Siemens 3-T TRIO MRI scanner (Erlangen, Germany). 
Blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast was measured with gradient echo 
T2*-weighted echo-planar images. To optimize functional sensitivity in the orbitofrontal 
cortex, we used a tilted acquisition sequence at 30 to the AC-PC line (Deichmann et al. 
2003) and an eight-channel phased array coil that yields a 40% signal increase in this area 
as compared to a standard coil. Each volume consisted of 32 axial slices in 3 mm 
thickness and 3  3 mm in-plane resolution; slices were collected in an interleaved 
ascending manner. The first 3 volumes in each session were discarded to permit T1 
equilibration. Other imaging parameters were as follows: repetition time, TR=2000 ms; 
echo time, TE=30 ms; field of view, 192192 mm. A high-resolution T1-weighted 
structural scan was acquired from each subject to facilitate localization and coregistration 
of functional data. Functional imaging data were acquired in two separate sessions of ~14 
min each. 
fMRI Data Preprocessing 
fMRI data analysis was performed by using SPM5 (Wellcome Department Imaging 
Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Images were corrected for slice 
acquisition time within each volume, motion corrected with alignment to the first volume, 
spatially normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute EPI template, and 
spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full width at half maximum of 8 mm. 
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Intensity normalization and high-pass temporal filtering (using a filter width of 128 s) 
were also applied to the data. The structural T1 images were coregistered to the mean 
functional EPI images for each subject and normalized using parameters derived from the 
EPI images. All regression models included six regressors indexing residual motion and 
two regressors for session baseline.  
fMRI Data Analysis 
1. Primary Model 
 Statistical analysis proceeded in three steps. First, we estimated a general linear model 
(GLM) with AR(1) and the following regressors that capture the main events in our 
experiment:  
(H1) An indicator function denoting product image presentation in the hypothetical trial; 
(H2) H1 modulated by mDV;  
(H3) H1 modulated by an indicator function denoting decision to purchase in the given 
trial;  
(H4) An indicator function denoting a first button press during product image 
presentation in the hypothetical trials; 
(H5) An indicator function denoting response phase (from the start of the response screen 
up to the point a subject submits a decision) in the hypothetical trials;  
(R1) An indicator function denoting product image presentation in the real trial;  
(R2) R1 modulated by mDV;  
(R3) R1 modulated by an indicator function denoting decision to purchase in the given 
trial;  
(R4) An indicator function denoting a first button press during product image 
presentation in the real trials;  
(R5) An indicator function denoting response phase in the real trials; 
The regressors H1, H5, R1, and R5 were modeled using box-car functions with subjects’ 
response time as a duration. The regressors H4 and R4 were modeled using stick 
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functions. We orthogonalized H4 and R4 with respect to H1 and R1, respectively. Each of 
the regressors was convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function. We also 
included regressors of no interest.  
After estimating a GLM, we then calculated the following 1st-level single-subject 
contrasts: (1) the real versus the hypothetical trial during image presentation (R1-H1), (2) 
image presentation in the hypothetical trials modulated by mDV (H2), (3) image 
presentation in the real trials modulated by mDV (R2), and (4) the real versus the 
hypothetical trials during image presentation modulated by mDV (R2-H2).  
We then calculated 2nd-level group contrasts using a one-sample t-test. Anatomical 
localizations were then performed by overlaying the t maps on a normalized structural 
image averaged across subjects, and with reference to an anatomical atlas (Duvernoy 
1999). 
2. Supplementary Model 
This model was estimated in order to compare non-switch hypothetical trials with real 
trials. It is identical to the primary model except that the hypothetical trials were sorted 
into switch and non-switch trials and modeled separately. The non-switch hypothetical 
trials are defined as the hypothetical trials whose decision remained the same in the 
surprise real trials. The switch trials are defined as the hypothetical trials in which a 
‘Yes’ (‘No’) decision changed to ‘No’ (‘Yes’) in the surprise real trials.  
The model included the following regressors of interest: 
(NS-H1) An indicator function denoting product image presentation in the non-switch 
hypothetical trials; 
(NS-H2) NS-H1 modulated by mDV; 
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(NS-H3) NS-H1 modulated by an indicator function denoting Yes choice in the given 
trial;  
(NS-H4) An indicator function denoting a first button press during product image 
presentation in the non-switch hypothetical trials; 
(NS-H5) An indicator function denoting response phase in the non-switch hypothetical 
trials; 
(S-H1) An indicator function denoting product image presentation in the switch 
hypothetical trials; 
(S-H2) S-H1 modulated by mDV; 
(S-H3) S-H1 modulated by an indicator function denoting Yes choice in the given trial;  
(S-H4) An indicator function denoting a first button press during product image 
presentation in the switch hypothetical trials; 
(S-H5) An indicator function denoting response phase in the switch hypothetical trials; 
(R1) An indicator function denoting product image presentation in the real trials; 
(R2) R1 modulated by mDV; 
(R3) R1 modulated by an indicator function denoting Yes choice in the given trial;  
(R4) An indicator function denoting a first button press during product image 
presentation in the real trials; 
(R5) An indicator function denoting response phase in the switch real trials; 
The regressors NS-H1, NS-H5, S-H1, S-H5, R1 and R5 were modeled using box-car 
functions with subjects’ response time as a duration. The regressors NS-H4, S-H4 and R4 
were modeled using stick functions. We orthogonalized NS-H4, S-H4 and R4 with respect 
to NS-H1, S-H1 and R1, respectively. The regressors of interest were convolved with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function. The model also included motion parameters 
and three regressors for session baseline as regressors of no interest.  
The 1st-level single-subject and 2nd-level group contrasts were created as in the primary 
model. 
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3. Psychophysiological interactions (PPIs) 
Psychophysiological interaction analysis (Friston et al. 1997) was performed to test the 
hypothesis that functional connectivity between the ACC and the mOFC would differ 
between the two types of trials, real and hypothetical. The analyses proceed in three 
steps. 
First, we extracted individual average time series of a region of interest (ROI). The ROI 
was defined as a 4 mm sphere surrounding individual subject peaks within the functional 
mask of the ACC shown in figure 3.12 (in orange, left panel and figure 3.16A). 
Individual subject peaks within the ACC mask were identified based on the areas having 
the highest Z-values in the Real*mDV – Hyp*mDV contrast. Variance associated with 
the six motion regressors was removed from the extracted time-series. The seed time 
course was then deconvolved, using the canonical hemodynamic response, in order to 
estimate the underlying neuronal activity in the ACC (Gitelman et al. 2003). 
Second, we estimated a GLM with the following regressors:  
(PPI-Reg1) An interaction between the neural activity in the seed region and a trial-type 
variable (Real trials coded as 1 and hypothetical trials as -1); 
(PPI-Reg2) A trial-type variable; 
(PPI-Reg3) The original BOLD eigenvariate (within the 4 mm sphere). 
The first two regressors were modeled as box-car functions with a duration that is equal 
to subjects’ response time during product image presentation in the given trial. These 
regressors were also convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function. The 
model also included motion parameters as regressors of no interest. Note that the first 
regressor identifies areas that exhibit task-related functional connectivity with the ACC; 
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specifically, it identifies areas in which the correlation in BOLD activity with the ACC 
increases differentially during real trials (as compared to hypothetical trials).  
Third, single subject contrasts for the first regressor were calculated, and then a second 
level analysis was performed by calculating a one-sample t-test on the single-subject 
contrast coefficients. The results of the second level contrast at p<0.001, uncorrected and 
with a 15-voxel extent threshold are depicted in figure 3.11. As shown in table 3.8, this 
PPI analysis also identified other regions in which activity correlated differentially with 
the ACC during the real trials in which subjects made real purchase decisions (as 
compared to hypothetical trials).  
Behavioral Results 
Bias in Hypothetical Decisions 
Given the procedure for selecting products for the scanning part, the distributions of WTP 
and decision value for the hypothetical and the real trials are almost identical (figure 3.4, 
table 3.1). Therefore, if there is no hypothetical bias (overstatement of WTP in 
hypothetical trials), there should be similar product purchase rates in all three types of 
trials. However, as found in previous economic studies (Blumenschein et al. 2007; 
Cummings et al. 1995; Johannesson et al. 1998; List 2001; List & Shogren 1998; Little & 
Berrens 2004; Murphy et al. 2005), subjects did show a significant pro-purchase bias 
during hypothetical decisions (figure 3.5). Subjects purchased 53% ± 1.74% (mean ± 
S.E.M.) of the products they saw in the hypothetical trials, a significantly higher rate than 
38% ± 3.10% and 40% ± 3.15% purchases in the real and surprise real trials, respectively 
(paired t-tests, t(24)=4.17, p< 0.0001 and t(24)=3.61, p< 0.0008 versus real and surprise 
real, respectively).  
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Figure 3.4 Histogram of willingness to pay (left panel) and decision value (right 
panel) by trial type. The size of a bin is 5. 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics for willingness to pay, decision value by trial 
type 
WTP  Mean  St. dev.  Min  Max  1st quartile  Median  3rd quartile 
Hypothetical  14.33  14.02  0  50  3  10  25 
Real  14.34  14.06  0  50  3  10  25 
 
DV  Mean  St. dev.  Min  Max  1st quartile  Median  3rd quartile 
Hypothetical  3.91  13.19  ‐27  48  ‐6  0  13 
Real  3.92  13.23  ‐27  48  ‐6  0  13 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Choices show a hypothetical “yes” bias. Choice data averaged across 
all 24 subjects. Subjects made more ‘yes’ purchase decisions in hypothetical 
trials (mean frequency ± S.E.M.). *p<0.005, n.s. = not significant. 
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For a logistic regression analysis of estimated DV and choice probability, we pooled the 
data from the hypothetical/real/surprise real trials and incorporated dummy variables for 
the hypothetical and the surprise real trials. Hence the logistic regression model includes 
purchase decision as a dependent variable (1 if a decision is ‘yes’; 0 otherwise), DV, 
Hypothetical Dummy (1 if a given trial is hypothetical; 0 otherwise), Surprise Real 
Dummy (1 if a given trial is surprise real; 0 otherwise) as independent variables with 
subject random effects. The results of a logistic regression analysis also show 
hypothetical bias (table 3.2, figure 3.6 top panel). By the definition of WTP, DV, and 
rational stochastic choice, a person should be more (less) likely to purchase a product 
when the DV of that product is high (low). At the true DV of zero, a person should be 
indifferent to buying and not buying, resulting in a purchase probability of 50%. Indeed, 
in the hypothetical trials purchase probabilities are close to 50% when the measured DV 
is close to zero (figure 3.6 top panel).  
 
Figure 3.6 Correction of biases in DV. The curves show fitted probability 
of ‘Yes’ purchase decisions before correction (top) and after correction 
(bottom). Y-axis: probability of ‘Yes’ decision. 
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Table 3.2 Results of random-effects logistic regression analysis for hypothetical 
dummy specification1  
   Coefficient  S.E.  z  p‐value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
DV  0.182  0.006  29.14  0.00  [0.169,   0.194] 
Hypothetical Dummy  1.139  0.120  9.51  0.00  [0.904,   1.373] 
Surprise Real Dummy  0.066  0.119  0.55  0.58  [‐0.167,  0.299] 
Constant  ‐1.352  0.100  ‐13.49  0.00  [‐1.548,  ‐1.156] 
 
However, in the real trials, the likelihood of purchase is lower than in the hypothetical 
trials, controlling for measured DV using the initial pre-scanner WTP values, and is much 
less than 50% for zero DV (figure 3.6 top panel). We hypothesized that when making real 
decisions, subjects adjust the WTP that was casually stated in the hypothetical pre-
scanner phase downward, which lowers DV and makes purchases less frequent.  
The initial overstatement of value is probably a result of preference uncertainty— people 
are not sure precisely what they would pay—combined with a default tendency to think 
about the value of the product in an ideal world (leading to overestimates of product 
value) (Tanner & Carlson 2009). This hypothesis is supported by a separate behavioral 
study comparing hypothetical and real WTP for the same product (See Section 3.5). 
Those subjects tended to report hypothetical WTPs which were reduced by 60% when 
real WTP was elicited (figure 3.17, 3.18 and table 3.11).  
Correction of Hypothetical Bias 
To investigate the brain circuitry that encodes the implied decision values in hypothetical 
versus real decision making, we corrected for this apparent reduction in hypothetical 
WTP during real decision making. To do so, a discount factor θR is estimated for each 
                                                 
1 Only the hypothetical dummy variable is significant—subjects’ purchase behavior in the surprise real 
trials was not significantly different from that in the real trials. The trials with missed responses (purchase 
decisions) were removed, leaving 3590 trials, instead of 3600. 
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subject, which creates a modified DV (mDV) of priceWTPR  . The value of θR was 
estimated for each subject by imposing the requirement that the fitted probability of 
purchase at the estimated mDV of zero is 50%. For comparability we also estimated 
subject-specific discount factors θH using the same requirement.2  
 
Figure 3.7 Median estimated θ for hypothetical and real trials. Signed rank test, 
**p<0.0003. Error bars indicate standard errors. 
 
Figure 3.6 (bottom panel) shows the smoothed choice probability curves using the 
modified DV. Figure 3.7 shows the median θH and θR for hypothetical and real trials, 
respectively (table 3.3). The median θH (1.03) is not significantly different from one, but 
the median θR (0.60) is significantly less than one (signed rank test, p>0.5 and p<0.0015, 
respectively). The median difference between θH and θR is also significantly different 
from zero (signed rank test, p<0.0003, figure 3.7).  
This weighting pattern suggests that people act as if they are using the originally stated 
WTP when making later hypothetical decisions, but are adjusting that WTP when making 
                                                 
2 Another conceivable way to modify DV is to keep WTP fixed, but to adjust prices by multiplying by a 
corrective factor θ. However, note that for hypothetical choices the unmodified DV, and unadjusted price, 
generate a reasonable choice probability fit. And to explain the low rate of purchase in the real condition 
would require multiplying the price by a factor greater than one. Assuming the perceived value of money is 
likely to be similar in real and hypothetical cases, the natural approach is therefore to assume that WTPs are 
adjusted downward (θR < 1) in the real choice condition.  
65 
 
real purchase decisions. This adjustment creates two measures of mDV which are 
comparable in their decision implications across the hypothetical and real conditions.  
Table 3.3 Estimated θ for modifying the decision value 
Subject ID  θH  θR 
1  1.70  0.49 
2  0.74  0.78 
3  0.88  0.78 
4  3.71  0.20 
5  0.42  0.38 
6  1.27  1.21 
7  0.96  0.68 
8  1.10  0.93 
9  0.53  0.25 
10  1.05  0.57 
11  1.09  0.64 
12  1.74  4.87 
13  1.27  1.75 
14  2.76  1.08 
15  1.02  0.40 
16  0.25  0.16 
17  1.21  0.45 
18  0.89  0.48 
19  0.84  0.35 
20  1.12  0.63 
21  0.95  0.77 
22  0.95  0.39 
23  1.06  0.65 
24  1.01  0.44 
Median  1.04  0.60 
Mean  1.19  0.80 
Std. Dev.  0.73  0.94 
Note: θH = θ for the hypothetical trials, θR = θ for the real trials. 
 
Decision times were also substantially faster in real choices than in hypothetical choices 
when mDV was positive (figure 3.8, p<.008); there was no difference in decision times 
when mDV was negative. The sensitivity of choice probability to modified DV is also 
greater, though modest, for real choices than for hypothetical ones (table 3.4, signed rank 
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test, one-sided p<0.032) The fact that real choices are faster and more sensitive to value 
input than hypothetical ones is behavioral evidence that neural processing may differ 
between real and hypothetical choices. 
Table 3.4 Individual differences in sensitivity of choice probability to mDV3 
Subject  β  for Real 
trials 
Β  for 
Hypothetical trials 
2  0.113  0.164 
3  0.185  0.279 
4  2.580  1.588 
5  0.598  0.398 
6  0.101  0.121 
7  0.333  0.348 
8  0.143  0.077 
9  0.573  0.317 
10  1.020  0.617 
11  0.736  0.828 
12  0.082  0.106 
13  0.248  0.196 
14  0.472  0.233 
15  0.383  1.268 
16  0.708  0.654 
17  1.528  0.457 
18  0.311  0.334 
19  0.935  0.380 
20  0.458  0.565 
21  1.088  0.127 
22  0.267  0.369 
23  0.647  0.468 
24  0.390  0.275 
Median  0.458  0.348 
Mean  0.604  0.442 
Std. Dev  0.564  0.367 
 
                                                 
3 The following logistic regression model was estimated for hypothetical and real trials, at an individual 
subject level. Decision = α + β × mDV + ε, where decision is 1 if a subject chose to buy and 0 otherwise. β 
coefficient for real trials are larger than those for hypothetical trials (signed rank test, one-sided, p-
value<0.032, z-value=1.860). Subject 1 was not included in the analysis since he used a cut-off rule in 
hypothetical trials and therefore his β coefficient for these trials could not be reliably estimated. 
67 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Average decision time in hypothetical and real trials by sign of mDV. 
Error bars indicate standard errors. 
 
fMRI Results 
Brain Areas with Higher Activation in Real Decision Making 
We first identified brain regions that were generally more active during the real trials than 
during the hypothetical trials at the time of product image presentation. Stronger 
activation in this phase for real than for hypothetical choice was shown only in 
ventromedial prefrontal regions, including the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) (x, y, z 
= -3, 39, -9; z =3.74) and subgenual cingulate (x, y, z = 0, 12, -9; z =3.64) (table 3.5, 
figure 3.9). There was no significant activation in the opposite contrast at p<.001.  
Table 3.5. Areas showing significant activity in the contrast of real versus 
hypothetical decision making 
Region  Laterality  BA  MNI coordinates  Z  Voxels 
Anterior Cingulate/ medial OFC  L  11/32  ‐3  39  ‐9  3.74  16 
Subgenual/ Subcallosal Gyrus  L  25  0  12  ‐9  3.64  8 
Frontal Lobe Sub‐Gyral  R    27  30  15  3.49  13 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L  25  ‐12  36  ‐12  3.37  5 
Height threshold, T = 3.485, p<0.001, uncorrected; extent threshold ,k = 5 voxels. L: left; R: right. 
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Figure 3.9 Brain areas more engaged in real versus hypothetical decision 
making.The mOFC is more actively engaged when real decisions are being 
made, compared to hypothetical decisions (contrast without decision value 
modulator: Real versus Hypothetical; k ≥ 5 voxels).  
 
 
Figure 3.10 Modulation of mDV in real versus hypothetical decisions. (A) The 
brain encodes modified DV in the shared areas in real and hypothetical trials 
(overlay of contrasts Real*mDV and Hyp*mDV). The “real” areas are a superset 
of the “hypothetical” areas. p<0.001, uncorrected. 
 
Modulation of Brain Activity by mDV 
To investigate which brain areas are responsible for encoding decision value in the 
hypothetical and the real trials, we identified areas that are correlated with the mDV 
regressor in a GLM during the product image presentation phase, using the differently 
adjusted mDV values in the two types of trials. We found common regions, including 
mOFC and the ventral striatum (VStr) in both types of trials (figure 3.10, table 3.6 and 
3.7). However, these areas active during hypothetical valuation are subsets of larger areas 
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active during real valuation, and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is correlated 
with the mDV only in real trials (x, y, z = -6, 33, 12; z =4.30) (figure 3.10).  
 
Table 3.6 Areas showing significant activity in the contrast of the parametric 
regressor for real decision making (real*mDV) 
Region  Laterality  BA  MNI coordinates  Z  Voxels 
Medial Frontal Gyrus/Medial OFC  L  10  ‐9  36  ‐6  4.95  223 
Anterior Cingulate  R  32  9  33  ‐9  4.12   
Caudate Head/Putamen/Thalamus  R    12  15  ‐3  4.49  522 
Sublobar  R    9  0  ‐9  4.30   
Anterior Cingulate/Corpus 
Callosum 
L  32  ‐6  33  12  4.30   
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L  13/47  ‐33  18  ‐12  4.47  107 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L    ‐24  48  3  3.55  7 
Anterior Cigulate  R  32  12  27  30  3.37  9 
Height threshold, T = 3.485, p<0.001, uncorrected; extent threshold, k = 5 voxels. L: left; R: right. 
 
Table 3.7 Areas showing significant activity in the contrast of the parametric 
regressor for hypothetical decision making (hyp*mDV) 
Region  Laterality  BA  MNI coordinates  Z  Voxels 
Caudate/ Lentiform Nucleus      ‐6  3  6  4.12  54 
Extranuclear  L    ‐12  ‐2  ‐12  3.75   
Anterior Cingulate  L  32  ‐3  30  ‐9  3.98  47 
Medial Frontal Gyrus/Medial 
OFC 
L  10/11  ‐6  39  ‐6  3.80   
Subcallosal Gyrus  L    ‐12  21  ‐15  3.17   
Thalamus  L    ‐3  ‐6  3  3.79  14 
Medial Frontal Gyrus/Medial OFC  L  10  12  33  ‐12  3.40  6 
Caudate Head  R     6  15  0  3.34  8 
Height threshold, T = 3.485, p<0.001, uncorrected; extent threshold, k = 5 voxels. L: left; R: right. 
 
A conjunction analysis (Nichols et al. 2005) between activities modulated by mDV in 
the real and the hypothetical trials confirmed that the mOFC (x, y, z = -6, 39, -6; z =3.8) 
and the VS (x, y, z = -3, 3, -6; z =3.66) are jointly recruited in both real and hypothetical 
trials (figure 3.11, table 3.8).  
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Figure 3.11 Conjunction analysis of Real*mDV and Hyp*mDV contrasts was 
performed to test the conjunction null hypothesis at a threshold p<0.001, 
uncorrected. The mOFC and VStr show conjointly significant activations 
modulated by mDV in both real and hypothetical decision making. 
 
Table 3.8 Conjunction analysis: areas showing conjointly significant activations 
modulated by mDV in both real and hypothetical decision making 
Region  Laterality  BA  MNI coordinates  Z  Voxels 
Anterior Cingulate  L  32  ‐6  30  ‐9  3.86  43 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L  10  ‐6  39  ‐6  3.8   
Sub‐lobar  L    ‐3  3  ‐6  3.66  28 
Medial Frontal Gyrus/ Medial OFC  R  11  9  36  ‐12  3.35  6 
Caudate Head  R     9  15  0  3.34  7 
Height threshold, T = 3.485, p<0.001, uncorrected; extent threshold, k = 5 voxels. L: left; R: right. 
 
The previous contrasts tell us that common areas are correlated with the decision value 
(mDV) in both the hypothetical and the real trials. We are also interested in differences in 
the sensitivity of those regions to mDV. Regions which are more sensitive to mDV in the 
real evaluation phase than in the hypothetical evaluation phase include the medial OFC 
and the ACC (x, y, z = -12, 33, -3; z =4.36), the caudate (x, y, z = 3, 3, 3; z =3.59), the 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (x, y, z = -27, 9, -18; z =3.8) (figure 3.12, table 3.9). The 
region of ACC activation observed in the real trials at p<.001 is only active in 
hypothetical trials at p<.05.  No areas are more sensitive to mDV in hypothetical decision 
making. 
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Figure 3.12 Significantly active areas in the [Real*mDV – Hyp*mDV] contrast. 
The mDV modulates mOFC and VStr activations in hypothetical decision 
making to a lesser extent. k  ≥ 5 voxels; orange: p<0.001, uncorrected; red: 
p<0.005, uncorrected. 
 
Table 3.9 Areas showing activity in the difference of the parametric regressors 
(real*mDV – hyp*mDV) 
Region  Laterality  BA  MNI coordinates  Z  Voxels 
Anterior Cingulate/ media OFC  L  11/32  ‐12  33  ‐3  4.36  46 
Caudate Head  R    12  15  ‐6  4.05  22 
Corpus Callosum  R    12  24  12  3.81  8 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L  47  ‐27  9  ‐18  3.8  39 
Caudate Head  R    3  3  3  3.59  11 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L    ‐30  48  9  3.54  5 
Anterior Cingulate   L  32  ‐6  30  24  3.53  42 
Anterior Cingulate  R  32  6  36  24  3.22  8 
Height threshold, T = 3.485, p<0.001, uncorrected; extent threshold, k = 5 voxels. L: left; R: right. 
 
To further examine the difference in sensitivity to mDV, we conducted a region-of-
interest (ROI) analysis on the common (overlapped) mOFC regions identified in figure 
3.10 (mOFC area in orange). Parameter estimates (β’s) from Real*mDV and Hyp*mDV 
contrasts were extracted within the overlapped mOFC region and averaged across all 
voxels in the region for each subject, and then the individual average β’s were averaged 
across subjects (figure 3.13). While the mOFC activation increases as a function of mDV 
in both trial types, it shows significantly higher sensitivity to mDV in real trials. 
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Figure 3.13 Subjects exhibited higher sensitivity to mDV in real trials compared 
to hypothetical trials (mean β ± SEM). *p<0.003, paired two sample t-test.  
 
 
Figure 3.14 Time-course plots of the same overlapped mOFC region in figure 
3.13 by response type and trial type. Circles (cross) indicate points in time where 
there is a significant difference between real and hypothetical yes (no) on paired 
t-test at p < 0.001. 
 
We also extracted trial averaged time-course data from the same mOFC area in figure 
3.13. This time-course graph was created by running another GLM using finite impulse 
response basis functions. First, trials were split according to the Yes/No purchase 
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decisions, resulting in Hypothetical Yes, Hypothetical No, Real Yes and Real No trials. 
These four types of trials were then modeled for ten 1 sec intervals after stimulus onset 
covering a total of 10 sec. This time course clearly shows the interaction of the response 
type with the trial type (figure 3.14). Although the mOFC shows a similar time course in 
response to both the hypothetical and the real No decision, it shows significantly higher 
activity in response to real Yes than hypothetical Yes. 
 
(A) 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 3.15 Supplementary model. (A) Overlapping regions of the 
contrast images, Real*mDV and Hyp*mDV. (B) The regions that are 
significant at p<0.001, uncorrected, in the contrast, Real*mDV – 
Hyp*mDV. 
The analyses reported so far (primary model) cannot rule out the possibility that less 
strong activations in hypothetical trials are due to noise added by inconsistent 
hypothetical decisions that later changed in the surprise real trials. To rule out this 
possibility, we estimated an additional GLM to compare only non-switch (consistent) 
hypothetical trials with real trials (supplementary model in experimental design and 
74 
 
methods). The resulting contrasts are reported in figure 3.15 and we found little 
difference from the results reported above. 
Task-Dependent Functional Connectivity between the ACC and the mOFC 
The ACC activation in response to value appeared strongly only in real trials. ACC is 
often involved in value computation, action selection, and executive function (Botvinick 
et al. 1999; van Veen et al. 2001; Yeung et al. 2006). This suggests that the special 
contribution of ACC in real choice might be in adjusting hypothetically stated WTP 
toward an adjusted value used in real choices (for example, integration of opportunity 
costs), which could also modulate activity in mOFC. In fact, a psychophysiological 
interactions (PPI) analysis did show increased functional connectivity between ACC and 
mOFC in real trials compared to hypothetical trials (figure 3.16, table 3.10). This 
empirical finding suggests ACC is specially recruited during real choice to adjust or 
control value signals transmitted to mOFC. 
(A) 
 
(B) 
 
 
Figure 3.16 PPI analysis. (A) ACC mask used to identify individual seed 
regions. (B) The functional connectivity between the ACC and the mOFC 
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becomes enhanced selectively in real trials, not in hypothetical trials. p<0.001, 
uncorrected, extent threshold k=15 voxels. 
 
Region  Laterality  BA  MNI coordinates  Z  Voxels 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L  10  ‐42  36  21  4.51  77 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L  46  ‐39  30  9  3.87   
Medial Frontal Gyrus  R  9  6  39  27  4.10  62 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L  47  ‐42  15  ‐3  4.00  34 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R    24  24  ‐3  3.86  24 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  10  ‐24  39  30  3.86  44 
Caudate Head/ Subcallosal Gyrus  R  25  9  6  ‐12  3.83  32 
Medial Frontal Gyrus/ Medial OFC  L  11/47  ‐12  21  ‐15  3.81  20 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R  11/47  27  24  ‐21  3.72  18 
Caudate Head/Putamen  L     ‐12  9  ‐3  3.64  28 
Height threshold, T=3.485, p<0.001, uncorrected; extent threshold, k = 15 voxels. L: left; R: right. 
 
Table 3.10 PPI analysis: Regions showing task related functional connectivity 
with the ACC (dfferentially for real > hypothetical choices). 
 
 
3.3 Behavioral Experiment for Hypothetical and Real 
Willingness to Pay 
Comparison of hypothetical and real purchase decisions in the fMRI study implies there 
is a gap between hypothetical WTP and real WTP for the same object—more 
specifically, hypothetical WTP is overstated compared to real WTP for the same object. 
We tested this hypothesis with a different group of subjects and report the results in this 
section.  
Experimental Design and Methods 
Participants, Stimuli, and Experimental Procedure 
Eleven Caltech male students participated in the experiment (mean age = 20.55 ± 3.42 
year; age range: 18–29). Subjects were paid $60 for participation. The experiment 
consisted of two parts of 200 trials each.  In the first part, subjects were presented with 
the same 200 consumer products as in the pre-scanning part of the fMRI study and asked 
76 
 
to report hypothetical willingness to pay, ranging $0~$50, for each item. The second part 
was identical to the first part except that they were unexpectedly asked to report real 
WTP for the same 200 items. This design allowed us to directly compare hypothetical 
and real WTP for the same product.  
To elicit real WTP in the second part, we employed a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction 
mechanism (Becker et al. 1964; Hare et al. 2008; Plassmann et al. 2007). The mechanism 
worked as follows: Subjects reported WTP for each of the 200 products. At the end of the 
experiment, one of the 200 trials from the real WTP part would be randomly selected. 
The computer generated a random integer between 0~50 (each integer over the interval 
was equally likely) and set it as a price for the item in the chosen trial. If the subject’s 
reported WTP was greater than the randomly generated price, say $X, then the subject 
paid $X and got the item. Otherwise, the subject did not get the product and paid nothing. 
The optimal strategy for a subject under this mechanism is to report exactly what one is 
willing to pay for the item presented (Becker et al., 1964).4 Since only one trial counted 
as real, subjects did not have to be concerned about spreading a $60 budget over the 
different items; they could treat each trial as if it were the only one that counted. These 
points were explained and emphasized during the instruction.   
Results 
Subjects exhibited a tendency to overestimate hypothetical WTP compared to real WTP. 
Figure 3.17 displays pairs of hypothetical and real WTP for the same product (blue dots). 
                                                 
4 Since the price for an item is determined by the randomly generated number, subjects cannot affect the 
price paid and have no incentive to report more or less than the true WTP. Deflating WTP could lead to 
loss of an opportunity to buy a product at a lower price than they are actually willing to pay. In contrast, 
subjects could end up paying more than they are willing to if they inflate WTP. 
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If hypothetical and real WTPs were equivalent, the dots should be placed along the 45° 
line (dashed line in red). However, most of the pairs are under the 45° line, indicating that 
subjects reduced initial hypothetical WTP by approximately 60% when later asked to 
report real (binding) WTP for the identical object. 
This pattern is also found at an individual subject level. Figure 3.18 shows individual 
subjects consistently overestimated WTP when the task was hypothetical, although there 
is individual variation in the tendency to over-report (table 3.11). These data clearly 
support the hypothesis that when making real choices, subjects downward-adjusted WTP, 
which was casually stated WTP in a hypothetical situation. 
 
 
Figure 3.17 Comparison of hypothetical and real WTP for the identical object. 
In the figure, real and hypothetical WTP are both jittered by adding 
uniform random numbers over the interval [-0.4, 0.4] to convey data 
density. The solid line is a fitted regression of real WTP on hypothetical 
WTP (Real WTP = 0.67 + 0.42(Hyp WTP), R2 = 0.40).  
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Table 3.11 Individual differences in hypothetical bias.  
 
Subject  β  α 
1  0.698  1.706 
2  0.386  0.173 
3  0.529  ‐1.834 
4  0.783  ‐0.065 
5  0.660  0.503 
6  0.273  ‐0.320 
7  0.496  0.502 
8  0.185  ‐0.441 
9  0.688  ‐0.961 
10  0.119  ‐0.650 
11  0.351  ‐1.103 
Mean  0.470  ‐0.226 
Median  0.496  ‐0.320 
Note: The following regression model was estimated at an individual subject 
level: Real WTP = α + β × Hypothetical WTP + ε. The estimated 
parameters are reported in the table below. Subjects’ real WTP for a 
product is substantially reduced compared to the hypothetical WTP, but 
the degree of reduction varies across subjects 
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Figure 3.18 Subjects consistently over-reported hypothetical WTP. Blue dots 
indicate hypothetical and real WTP for the same product (x-axis: hypothetical 
WTP, y-axis: real WTP). The figures are jittered as in figure 3.17. Solid red lines 
are fitted regression lines of real WTP on hypothetical WTP. The slopes of the 
solid lines are reported in table 3.11.  
 
3.4  Behavioral Experiment for Ordering Effects 
In the fMRI study, the hypothetical-then-real order was deliberately not counterbalanced 
for the following reasons. First, it is possible that there might be an ordering effect in 
which thinking about real choices first would spill over to affect valuation in hypothetical 
tasks. Identifying such an effect, however, would require counterbalancing and 
substantially more subjects. Second, we also estimated the primary GLM in the main text 
with a trial number included as an additional regressor and then repeated the analysis; 
there was little difference in results. Any plausible model of ordering effects should show 
a within-block effect of trials (due to practice effects, for example), so any such effects 
are controlled for in the GLM as modified above. Third, hypothetical decision followed 
by real decision is a natural order for forecasting purposes. In most applications, 
hypothetical decision data are gathered in advance of real decisions—e.g., polls are only 
useful before elections. Hence, this particular order of events (hypothetical followed by 
real decision) is of the most interest. Finally, we tested if opposite real-then-hypothetical 
order would vanish hypothetical bias in a separate behavioral study outside of the scanner 
and confirmed that the trial type order has little effect on behavior. In the following 
section, this behavioral experiment for testing ordering effects is briefly described and the 
results are reported.  
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Experimental Design and Methods 
Participants, Stimuli and Experimental Procedure 
Fifteen Caltech students participated in the behavioral experiment (all male; mean ± st. 
dev. = 20.5 ± 2.97 year; age range = 17–27). Four additional subjects initially 
participated in the experiment, but upon completion of the first part, their price (median 
WTP) was $0. Hence, they were not asked to continue.   
The experimental procedure, task and stimuli were identical except that the order of 
hypothetical and real blocks in the second part had changed. In the first part, participants 
stated willingness to pay for each of 200 consumer product as in the fMRI experiment. In 
the second part, however, they first went through 50 real purchase decision-making trials 
and then 50 hypothetical decision-making trials; this reversal in hypothetical and real 
blocks allowed us to test if hypothetical bias is solely due to “hypothetical-then-real” 
ordering effects. Lastly, they were unexpectedly showed the products presented in the 
hypothetical trials and asked to make ‘surprise’ real decisions on these items. Unlike the 
fMRI experiment, all parts of the behavioral experiment were conducted outside the 
scanner and subjects were run in a batch (multiple subjects at a time). 
Results 
The participants in this behavioral study also showed hypothetical bias—significantly 
higher purchase percentage in the hypothetical trials than the real/surprise real trials 
(figure 3.19).  
However, the overall purchase percentage in the behavioral study is approximately 10% 
lower for all types of trials than the fMRI study. This overall decline might be due to 
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session variability such as: (1) the statistical variance of price was larger for the fMRI 
subjects (35.21 compared to 12.11 of the behavioral subjects); (2) the behavioral subjects 
might not have been from the same subject pool as the fMRI subjects—the subjects in the 
behavioral experiment might have behavioral characteristics that are different from the 
fMRI subjects (such as a risk attitude—some subjects only participate in behavioral 
experiments due to a fear of the fMRI technique); (3) unlike the fMRI study, multiple 
subjects (about 10) were run simultaneously.  
(A) (B) 
 
Figure 3.19 Regardless of the order of the trial types, subjects exhibit 
hypothetical bias (paired two sample t-tests, two-sided). (A) Purchase percentage 
by the participants in the fMRI study. (B) Purchase percentage by the participants 
in the behavioral study of ordering effects.  
 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Our study was motivated by the fact that hypothetical statements of intended choice are 
often different from real choices. In commercial marketing research, for example, self-
reported intentions to buy goods are one of the most widely used measures to forecast 
sales of existing products, to test and plan the launch of new products (Chandon et al. 
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2004; Infosino 1986; Jamieson & Bass 1989; Silk & Urban 1978; Urban et al. 1983), and 
to assess the effectiveness of marketing programs (Raghubir & Greenleaf 2006; Schlosser 
et al. 2006). However, the fact that so many new products test well and then sell poorly 
suggests that forecasts based on reported intentions are imperfect. In the public policy 
arena and markets for public goods (e.g., clean air, foreign policy), data on what people 
actually choose are limited. There are no special markets for these goods, so voters’ 
preferences for them are often coarsely inferred from reactions to political positions. 
Therefore, public economists and health economists often try to measure actual 
preferences from hypothetical responses to survey questions about possible actions 
(Carson et al. 1996; Diamond & Hausman 1994; Mortimer & Segal 2008). In political 
science, polls provide valuable information about voters’ perceptions and preferences 
(Crespi 1989), but pre-election questions about voting intentions are always hypothetical. 
The newest research treats survey responses as deliberate products of a psychological and 
economic process by respondents, in order to understand their likely biases better and 
improve surveys (McFadden et al. 2005).   
Furthermore, even actual choices often have hypothetical future choices embedded in 
them. For example, a student might make a real choice of a college to attend, planning to 
major in pre-medical studies. The planned major is an intended or a hypothetical future 
choice because it can be easily reversed.   
The major behavioral result of our study is that subjects did exhibit a tendency to say 
“Yes” to questions about purchasing consumer goods more often in hypothetical choices 
than in real choices. This “yes bias” is present when the real choices are different goods 
and when they are the same goods, and is unaffected by counterbalancing the condition 
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order (see Section 3.6). The bias can be characterized parametrically by the hypothesis 
that an initially stated WTP (elicited before the fMRI scanning) is reduced during real 
choice by a multiplier θR, which is typically less than one (a median of .60 in these data). 
Intuitively, subjects change their minds and make real choices as if they will pay about 
40% less than they initially said they might. When the initial WTP is adjusted to fit actual 
choices, subjects’ choice frequencies then appear to be a smooth logistic function of the 
modified decision value, thati is,  R WTP  price .  
FMRI compares differential activity in response to mDV during presentation of the 
product image—the time at which we assume valuation occurs—in real trials and in 
hypothetical trials. Three ROIs emerge in this comparison: mOFC, VStr, and ACC. 
Regions active in hypothetical choice in mOFC and VStr are subsets of the regions active 
in real choice. ACC is highly significantly active in response to mDV only in real choice. 
Medial OFC activity is correlated with decision value in both hypothetical and real 
decision making. Studies have found that the OFC, especially the medial part, is 
responsible for encoding the reward value of food, pleasant smells, attractive faces, and 
abstract rewards such as money or avoiding an aversive outcome (Anderson et al. 2003; 
Gottfried et al. 2003; Kim et al. 2006; O'Doherty et al. 2001; O’Doherty et al. 2003; 
Small et al. 2001). Our study uses consumer objects that have many product features and 
therefore require substantial abstract processing (including integration of the monetary 
price) which expands the scope of rewards that the mOFC appears to encode.  
The medial OFC region identified in this study is similar to areas found to encode 
economic decision values in previous studies (Hare et al. 2008; Knutson et al. 2007; 
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Plassmann et al. 2007). Interestingly, activity in mOFC is stronger (more sensitive to 
decision value) and also more spatially widespread in real choice than in hypothetical 
choice. It is quite possible that the hypothetical bias might be related to an enhanced 
value signal in the brain, but the heightened mOFC activity during real choice casts doubt 
on this possibility. 
The VStr activation in response to mDV could also be encoding decision value, as shown 
in many studies (Hariri et al. 2006; Kable & Glimpcher 2007; McClure et al. 2007; 
Yacubian et al. 2006). Or it could be encoding a prediction error—the deviation of a new 
reward from a predicted reward (in our case, the mDV of a good compared to recent 
mDVs), as suggested by a recent study which separates values and prediction errors 
(Hare et al. 2008). If a stronger VStr response reflects reaction to prediction error, then 
learning about values could be more rapid when choices are real, which is a new 
implication of these results that could be tested in future studies. 
An important open question is what neural activity is actually creating the “yes bias.” 
Linking the stated object WTP dollar values to later choices suggests the bias is due to 
overstatement of object values in the pre-scanning phase. This overstatement may be 
generated by preference uncertainty or ignoring other alternatives and opportunity 
costs—that is, evaluating an option in isolation from others in an ideal world (Tanner & 
Carlson 2009). Our data show that in hypothetical choices, those overstated values seem 
to be used (since the discounting factor θH is around 1), but in real choices they are 
adjusted downward by the discount factor θR. This discount factor θR is .60 in the fMRI 
study and is comparably less than one, .40 in a separate behavioral study. 
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A candidate region for implementation of this adjustment of stated WTP is the ACC. The 
ACC is only activated strongly, in response to mDV, in real decision making. 
Furthermore, functional connectivity between the ACC and the mOFC is stronger in real 
trials as compared to hypothetical trials. In addition, in real choice, the probabilities of 
purchase are more sensitive to modified value and response times are faster (for “Yes” 
decisions); these are possible behavioral manifestations of additional activity in ACC and 
mOFC. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that ACC is implementing a 
stronger reduction of casually-expressed WTP, to create an adjusted mDV that guides 
decisions, when real money is on the line. This possibility is consistent with the 
established role of ACC in executive function, cognitive control, and Stroop tasks which 
require effortful overrides of highly learned automatic responses (Botvinick et al. 1999; 
van Veen et al. 2001; Yeung et al. 2006). While we have not found any cross-subject 
differences in ACC activity which are related to the degree of WTP adjustment θR, 
studies aimed more closely at discovering such relations are promising. 
One potential way to use fMRI and other measures is to classify trial-by-trial hypothetical 
“Yes” choices into those which are likely to switch to real “No” choices and those which 
are likely to stick as real “Yes” choices. Economists have tested some simple behavioral 
adjustments to estimate the overall switch minus stick rate, but there is no ideal technique 
that works reliably (Cummings & Taylor 1999; Knoepfle et al. 2009; List 2001). Much as 
in lie detection (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad 2003; Davatzikosa et al. 2005; Gamer et al. 2007), 
reading hidden intentions (Haynes et al. 2007) and other domains (Haxby et al. 2001; 
Mitchell et al. 2008), it is possible that neural activation could provide another basis for 
some kind of low-level “mind-reading” of this sort. Such an application could 
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conceivably improve high-stakes forecasts for political polling, product design, and 
personal commitment substantially. Unfortunately, there are not enough switches in our 
data to permit a powerful classification based on neural activity of switches versus sticks 
(table A3.3) as in Grosenick et al. (Grosenick et al. 2008). However, a simple 
classification based on mDV and RTs predicts hypothetical-to-real switches and sticks 
with about 70% out-of-sample accuracy compared to a normalized 50% baseline— 
namely, when mDV is low and responses are fast, hypothetical “Yes” decisions are likely 
to turn into real “No” decisions. (table A3.4). This baseline might be improved by more 
targeted studies using fMRI and other methods.  
Finally, our study has an important methodological implication for scientific practice. In 
many experiments, especially in psychology and neuroscience, it is common to elicit 
hypothetical choices or ask hypothetical questions which cannot be actually implemented 
for practical reasons (e.g., for very high stakes, payments with long delays, creating 
unusual highly controlled social events, or morally charged consequences (Delgado et al. 
2005; Greene et al. 2004; Greene et al. 2001; Hariri et al. 2006; Monterosso et al. 2007; 
Takahashi et al. 2009)). 
Generalizing claims about neural processing based on hypothetical choices to real choice 
assumes that the neural processes in hypothetical and real choice are highly overlapping. 
Fortunately, our study shows that this overlap is largely present, at least in the narrow 
domain of consumer goods purchase. That is, suppose our study had used only 
hypothetical choices, concluded that mOFC and VStr are encoding decision value of 
consumer goods, and then guessed that the same regions would be active in response to 
valuation during real choices of consumer goods. Our results show that this guess would 
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have been correct (while understating signal strength and spatial extent).  However, such 
a study would have failed to show that ACC responds to decision value, and might have 
concluded, incorrectly, that ACC plays no role in real choice.  
As we have noted, for many phenomena in natural and social sciences, collecting 
hypothetical choice data is all we can do, even though the goal of collecting those data is 
to understand and predict real choices. Further studies should therefore continue to 
explore both similarities and differences in hypothetical and real choices, in different 
choice domains and with an eye to interesting applications.   
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3.6  Appendix for Chapter 3 
Table A3.1 List of 200 Consumer Products Used in the Study. The retail price of the 
products ranged from $20 to $100. Approximately 300 products were initially collected 
by the experimenters and about 100 of the most unpopular items were screened out by a 
pilot study, leaving 200 products used in the study 
Product Name Product Name 
90's Decade Box Gift Basket - Classic 90's Candy Logitech Quickcam for Notebooks Deluxe  
Abercrombie and Fitch Boxers - Set of 2 Lomographic Fisheye Number 2 Camera 
Abercrombie and Fitch Canvas And Rubber Flip 
Flops 
M-51 Engineers Field Bag - Military Style 
Abercrombie and Fitch Cap New York Math Formula Tie 
Abercrombie and Fitch Kilburn Low Rise Boot Jean Maxtor−OneTouch 4 Mini 120GB External Hard 
Drive 
Abercrombie and Fitch Short Sleeve Tee Hopkins 
Trail 
Megatech Hydro-Fly 18'' Radio Controlled 
Land/Air/Sea Vehicle 
Accudart Classic Bristle Dartboard  Microsoft Natural Ergo Keyboard 
Adidas 3-Stripes Dazzle Tearaway Mens’ Warm-up 
Pants 
Millafleur Glass Electric Guitar Lamp 
AeroBed® Sport Minute Twin airbed  Monopoly Deluxe Edition 
Age of Empires III-Windows  Motorized Bumper Boat 
Allied 180-pc. Household Tool Set  Motorola 25 Mile, 22 Channel 2-Way Radios (Pair) 
Andy Mac Zon Complete Skateboard Mrs. Fields Soho 12 Cookie Box 
Antworks - Space Age Ant Habitat Nikon Action 8x40 Binocular 
Apple 1 GB iPod Shuffle AAC/MP3 Player Nintendo Game Boy Advance 
Arrested Development− The Complete Series 
(Seasons 1, 2, 3) (2003) 
Nintendo Game Boy Micro 
Audio X Rocker with built-in subwoofer and speakers Northface Campus Backpack 
Austin Bazaar 38" Black Guitar with Carrying Bag 
and Accessories 
Northface M Amp Hybrid Jacket 
Bach Tie Northface Utility Waist–Sport Hiker 
Banner American Desktop Work Station Number Pad Mouse 
Black and Decker 12 cup SmartBrew plus 
Coffeemaker 
Obus Forme Memory Foam Travel Pillow  
Black and Decker 15.6 Volt HEPA Cyclonic 
DustBuster  
Olympus 128 MB Digital Voice Recorder with PC 
Link 
Black and Decker 4-Slice Stainless Steel Toaster 
Oven 
Omron Digital Premium Pedometer  
Boss Seating Fabric Adjustable Task Chair Oral B Professional Care Power Toothbrush  
Braun Electric Water Kettle Oregon Scientific ExactSet Projection Clock with 
Cable-Free Weather Forecaster 
Braun Smart Control 3 Shaver  Organic Nut Harvest Basket 
Brookstone 12-Language Translater  Oster Egg Cooker  
Brookstone 9-in-1 Multi Tool with LED  Pail of Treats−Mrs. Fields 48 bite-sizes cookies and
18 brownie bites 
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Brookstone Digital Camera Keychain  Panasonic Upper Arm Blood Pressure Monitor 
Brookstone Laptop Essentials Kit  Periodic Table Shower Curtain 
Brookstone Lighted Lap Desk  Perpetual Calendar 
Brookstone MP3 Stereo Speaker  Philips Norelco Rechargeable Razor 
Brookstone Rechargeable Booklight  Philips Progressive-scan DVD Player 
Brookstone Wireless FM Transmitter  Planet Earth−The Complete BBC Series (DVD) 
Brother Personal Labeler  Plantronics Wireless Bluetooth Headset 
Bushnell ImageView 7x18 VGA Pocket Digital 
Camera Binocular 
PowerBar® Performance The Original Energy Bar, 
Peanut Butter (Pack of 24) 
Calvin Klein− Men's Bamboo Dress Socks 2 Set of 3-
Pack (6 pairs) 
Premium Diamond Suited Poker Chip Set 
Canon Color Image Scanner  Prodikeys MIDI Keyboard 
Casio 2.7" Shock Resistant Portable LCD TV  Puma−Men's Quarter Crew Socks 2 Set of 3-Pack 
(6 pairs) 
Casio Mens G-Shock Classic Watch  Ravensburger Oceanic Wonders 3000 Piece Jigsaw 
Puzzle 
Celestron ExploraScope 80mm Reflector Telescope  Raytek MiniTemp No-Contact Thermometer with 
Laser Sighting 
Classic Pillow by Tempur Pedic  Razor A Kick Scooter 
Clif Bar Nutrition Bars, Variety Pack 2.4-Ounce Bars 
(Pack of 24) 
RCA Small Wonder Digital Next Generation 
Camcorder 
Coby 7" Widescreen Digital Photo Frame with MP3 
Player 
Real Theater Popcorn Kit - 20 Pack 
Coca-Cola Personal Fridge  Roll-Up Keyboard 
Columbia Sportswear Men's Trail Hiking Boot  Roller Slide−Ab Slider with Computer LCD Read-
out 
Columbia Sportswear's Men's Steens Mountain 
Sweater 
SanDisk Sansa 2GB Photo MP3 Player 
Columbia The Zone 0° Mummy Sleeping Bag   See's Candies−Toffee-Ettes and Almond Royal 
Cooler Master NotePal Notebook Cooler  Seinfeld−Seasons 1 and 2 (1993) 
Cranium (Board game)  Sharper Image All-In-One Games Set - chess, 
checkers, backgammon, and poker 
Deluxe Turntable Scrabble  Sharper Image Atomic Projection Clock with 
Indoor Temperature 
Desktop Organizer, 5/8" Wood, Corner Radius, 
Three-Way Use 
Sharper Image Bright As Day Power-Port Desk 
Lamp 
Desktop Personal Air Conditioner  Sharper Image Digital 130X USB Microscope 
Camera 
Digital WiFi Detector  Sharper Image Sports Duffle Bag 
Dymo LabelWriter 400 Label Printer  Sharper Image Turbo Ear and Nose Hair Trimmer 
Fold-Away Wooden Chess Set  Sigma PC 15 Heart Rate Monitor 
Fossil Men's Texas Multifunction Watch   Smallville−The Complete First Season (2001) 
Fossil Mens Rimless Sunglasses - Rider - Polarized  SolidTek DigiMemo 6"x9" Digital Notepad with 
Memory 
Gaiam Abs Ball Workout Kit   Sony CD/Cassette Portable Boombox 
Garmin eTrex Handheld GPS Navigator   Sony DJ Style Monitor Series Headphones 
GODIVA 1lb Milk Chocolate Dipped Pretzel Canister  Sony Micro Vault Tiny GB USB Flash Drive with 
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Virtual Expander 
GODIVA 50 pc. Biscuit Assortment Gift Tin  Sony Quick Battery Charger with 4 AA Batteries  
GODIVA Biscuit Collection Gift Tin (50 pc)  Sony Stereo CD Clock Radio with Dual Alarm 
GODIVA Chocoiste Solid Milk Chocolate Bars (24 
pc) 
Sony Water-Resistant Weather Band Shower Radio 
GODIVA Spring Milk Chocolate Gift Box (22 pc)  Sony Wireless Headphone System 
GODIVA Thank you Ballotin (70pc)  Spinmaster Air Hogs Battling Havoc R/C 
Helicopters 
GPX Karaoke System with Integrated 5-1/2" Black 
and White Monitor  
Star Wars Episode VI - Return of the Jedi (1983, 
2004 Versions, 2-Disc) 
Green Laser Pointer (5 mW, Class IIIa Laser Product)  Star Wars Trilogy (with Bonus Disc) (1977)  
Guitar For Dummies (Lifestyles Paperback)  Starwars R2-D2 mimobot® 2GB USB Drive 
Gundam X: G-Falcon Unit Double X Model Kit 1/100 
Scale 
SuperPen Graphics Tablet 
Hamilton Beach Pump Espresso/Cappuccino maker  Swiss Gear 7x7-Foot 3-Person Sport Dome Cheval 
Tent  
Hamilton Beach TrueAir Plug-Mount Odor 
Eliminator 
T-Fal Avante Deluxe 4-Slice Toaster 
Harbinger Pro Series Workout Glove  Tangle DNA Speakers 
Harry and David Fancy Fruit Buffet - Ready to Serve 
Dried Fruit Medley 
Tanita Duo Scale with Body Fat/Water Monitor 
Harry and David Super Moose Munch® Party Drum -
Caramel Popcorn, Chocolates, S'Mores etc. 
TAO 1.5" Digital Keychain Photo Frame 
Heelys Men's Octane  Tempur-Pedic Neck Pillow 
Hitch iPod2iPod USB Transfer Device  Texas Instruments TI-83 Plus Graphing Calculator 
Hohner Meisterklasse Harmonica, Key of D   Thanko FM/MP3 Watch 1GB  
Holmes Medium Room Cool Mist Humidifier   The Adventures of Indiana Jones - The Complete 
DVD Collection (1981)  
HoMedics Therapist Select Quad-Action Percussion 
Massager 
The Complete Idiot's Guide to Weight Training and 
Body Sculpting (2 Paperbacks) 
HoMedics Therapist Select Shiatsu Massaging 
Cushion  
The Lord of the Rings - The Motion Picture Trilogy 
(Platinum Series Special Extended Edition) (2004) 
Honeywell .54-Cubic-Foot Shelf and Floor Anti-Theft 
Safe with Digital Keypad 
The Office−Season One (2005) 
Honeywell Platinum Air Purifier   The Simpsons−The Complete Tenth Season (1989) 
Hoover Tempo Widepath Bagged Upright Vacuum  Timberland Men's Chest Logo Full Zip Sweatshirt 
HP Photosmart Printer  Timberland Men's Lexington Sport Oxford  
imation 2GB USB 2.0 Clip Flash Drive with 
Carabineer and Rubberized Shell 
Timberland Stratham Claremont Laptop Messenger 
Bag 
iNeed™ Lumbar Massage Pillow  Timberland Treeline Travel Gear Back Pack Large  
James Bond Ultimate Edition−Vol. 1  Timex Men's Chrono Alarm Watch 
KEM Playing Cards (Paisley, 100% Cellulose Acetate 
Plastic)  
Tortuga Original Caribbean Rum Cake, 33 Ounce 
Cake 
Kensington DomeHub USB 2.0 (7 ports) Weighted 
Hub 
Tripod Speaker for MP3 Player 
Kodak EasyShare 6.2MP Digital Camera with 3X 
Optical Zoom 
Valeo Yoga Kit 
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Koolatron Kool Fridge  Victorinox Hanging Toiletry Kit by Swiss Army  
KORG Digital Metronome and Instrument Tuner   Victorinox Swiss Army Credit Card-Size Multi-
Tools with LED Light 
LAMPS PLUS Blue and Yellow Silver Base Lava 
Lamp 
Victorinox Swiss Army Explorer Multitool Knife 
Latin Percussion Mini Tunable Wood Conga  Victorinox Travel Wallet First Class by Swiss 
Army 
Levi's Relaxed Straight 559 Jeans  Video Watch with OLED Screen 
Levitating Desktop Globes  VIOlight Ultraviolet Toothbrush Sanitizers 
Linksys Wireless-G Router  VIOlight Ultraviolet Travel Toothbrush Sanitizers 
Logitech 2.4 GHz Cordless Presenter with Laser 
Pointer 
Water Powered Multifunction Alarm Clock 
Logitech Cordless Laser Mouse  Welcom WearEver Deluxe Aluminum Hi-Back 
Backpack Chair  
Logitech Gaming Keyboard  Zelco Bookmark Dictionary 
 
 
  
92 
 
Table A3.2 Price for Individual Subjects. 
Subject ID Price 
1 17 
2 11 
3 20 
4 2 
5 10 
6 27 
7 10 
8 14 
9 6 
10 5 
11 5 
12 5 
13 8 
14 18 
15 10 
16 3 
17 3 
18 10 
19 12 
20 9 
21 15 
22 12 
23 8 
24 10 
Mean 10.42 
Median 10 
St.Dev 5.93 
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Table A3.3 The Number of Decision Switches Between Hypothetical and Surprise Real 
Trials. The trials with missed responses were removed, hence leaving 1197 trials, instead 
of 1200.  
 
 Yes→Yes Yes→No No→Yes No→No total 
Count 450 190 29 528 1197 
% 38% 16% 2% 44%  
Yes→Yes (No→No): Hypothetical Yes (No) decision which remained the same in the surprise real trials.  
Yes→No (No→Yes): Hypothetical Yes (No) decision which switched to No (Yes) in the surprise real trials 
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Table A3.4 We performed a linear discriminant analysis for each subject with RT and 
mDV as independent variables (See (A) in the following page) and decision switch as a 
dependent variable (switch = 1, stick = 0). The detailed classification procedure was as 
follows for each subject: 
1. Select all hypothetical Yes trials.  
2. Among all the hypothetical Yes trials, select a training set (n=20). 
a. If there are more than 10 switch trials (hypothetical Yes  surprise real 
No: YN) and 10 stick trials (hypothetical yes surprise real yes: YY), 
randomly select 10 from each of switch and stay trials. In this case, 50% is 
a base success rate. 
b. If there are more than 10 YN trials but less than 10 YY trials, select all 
YY trials and randomly select (20 – # of YY trials) of YN trials. 
c. If there are less than 10 YN trials but more than 10 YY trials, select all 
YN trials and randomly select (20 – # of YN) of YY trials. 
d. Subjects whose YY or YN are less than 5 are excluded in the classification 
analysis. 
3. Leave one observation out for test. 
4. Conduct a linear discriminant analysis (LDA) with the rest of the data (n=19) and 
predict the one left out (switch [YN] or stick [YY]). 
5. Repeat steps 2~3 1000 times. 
 
We also repeated the same classification analysis with RT and confidence (Strong, Weak) 
as independent variables and decision switch as a dependent variable. The results are 
reported in (B). 
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(A) Classification Analysis of Decision Switches Using RT and mDV. 
Subject ID 
# of 
hypothetical 
yes 
# of 
sticks 
(YY) 
# of 
switches 
(YN) 
Base 
success 
rate 
% of 
correct 
predictions
Sensitivity Specificity
1 27 19 8 0.60 0.53 0.39 0.63 
2 25 19 6 0.70 0.59 0.55 0.61 
3 25 18 7 0.65 0.58 0.44 0.65 
8 30 18 12 0.50 0.70 0.71 0.69 
9 23 12 11 0.50 0.76 0.68 0.83 
10 26 20 6 0.70 0.69 0.77 0.66 
11 29 22 7 0.65 0.72 0.72 0.72 
14 41 24 17 0.50 0.66 0.69 0.63 
15 23 10 13 0.50 0.75 0.76 0.73 
17 32 26 6 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.72 
18 25 18 7 0.65 0.63 0.49 0.70 
19 23 8 15 0.60 0.76 0.67 0.90 
20 27 21 6 0.70 0.53 0.52 0.54 
21 27 18 9 0.55 0.66 0.65 0.67 
23 26 15 11 0.50 0.84 0.87 0.82 
24 26 12 14 0.50 0.61 0.63 0.60 
        
mean 27.19 17.5 9.69 0.59 0.67 0.64 0.69 
St. dev. 4.45 4.98 3.65 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.09 
s.e. 1.11 1.24 0.91 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Notes:  
(1) The classification success rate is significantly higher than the baseline success rate (paired two 
sample t-test, one-tail, p<0.028). 
(2) Sensitivity = % of correctly predicted switches; specificity = % of correctly predicted sticks 
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(B) The Same Analysis of Decision Switches Using RT and Confidence (Yes/No). 
 
Subject ID 
# of 
hypothetical 
yes 
# of 
sticks 
(YY) 
# of 
switches 
(YN) 
base 
success 
rate 
% of 
correct 
predictions
Sensitivity Specificity
1 27 19 8 0.60 0.54 0.46 0.60 
2 25 19 6 0.70 0.35 0.36 0.35 
3 25 18 7 0.65 0.73 0.56 0.82 
8 30 18 12 0.50 0.65 0.60 0.70 
9 23 12 11 0.50 0.82 0.63 1.00 
10 26 20 6 0.70 0.67 0.96 0.55 
11 29 22 7 0.65 0.76 0.88 0.69 
14 41 24 17 0.50 0.55 0.63 0.46 
15 23 10 13 0.50 0.66 0.58 0.82 
17 32 26 6 0.70 0.75 0.88 0.70 
18 25 18 7 0.65 0.88 0.98 0.82 
19 23 8 15 0.60 0.87 0.78 1.00 
20 27 21 6 0.70 0.71 0.83 0.66 
21 27 18 9 0.55 0.71 0.70 0.72 
23 26 15 11 0.50 0.80 0.64 0.96 
24  26  12  14  0.50  0.53  0.63  0.44 
        
mean 27.19 17.5 9.69 0.59 0.69 0.69 0.70 
St. dev. 4.45 4.98 3.65 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.20 
s.e. 1.11 1.24 0.91 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Notes:  
(1) The classification success rate is significantly higher than the baseline success rate (paired two 
sample t-test, one-tail, p<0.021). 
(2) Sensitivity = % of correctly predicted switches; specificity = % of correctly predicted sticks 
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Chapter 4 
Optimal-Timing Decisions: An Experimental Study of a 
Multiagent Timing Game 
 
4.1  Introduction 
We often face situations where we have to decide when to take an action. Rewards can 
grow over time, so patience can pay off. But, while waiting, you are risking the 
possibility that someone else may take the rewards you have long waited to grow, or that 
the rewards may decrease in value – a stock market selling decision is a relevant 
example. When rewards from waiting versus taking an immediate action are weighed 
against each other, what is the optimal timing decision? This is a much studied question 
in industrial economics and management (Dutta et al. 1995; Fudenberg & Tirole 1985; 
Lambkin 1988; Robinson & Fornell 1985).  The timing of R&D investments, new 
technology adoption, new product launches, and entry to new markets determines the 
success and survival of firms in the market. The benefits of being a first mover always 
trade off against those of being a follower1 and this issue at its core is a firms’ optimal-
timing problem.  
                                                 
1 First movers or early adopters have advantages that arise from initial larger market share; technological 
leadership (proprietary experience, patents); preemption of assets (geographic space, controlling natural 
resources, plants, and equipment); customer loyalty or switching costs. In contrast, followers can benefit 
from the ability to freeride on pioneering firms’ investments; resolution of technological and market 
uncertainty; incumbent inertia (slow to respond to change in market conditions or customer needs) 
(Lieberman & Montgomery 1988).  
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A timing decision familiar to academics is when to stop analysis and send a paper out for 
publication. Spending more time on extra analysis and putting more materials in the 
paper can improve the quality of the paper and hence increase the chance of publication 
in a prestigious journal. However, if many other researchers have been working on a 
similar topic, then you are risking the chance of being ‘scooped.’ So academics are often 
torn between the choice of “stop and send it in” and that of “work a little bit more.” 
Another timely example, perhaps, is suggested by the recent housing market crash. 
Whoever invested in a house for speculative purposes in the past several years and did 
not sell before the crash would probably be regretting his or her bad timing decision.  
In this experimental study, we consider an optimal timing decision where strategic 
motives for delaying and taking an immediate action must be weighed against each other. 
We adopt the clock game first introduced by Brunnermeier and Morgan (2008) (BM) in 
order to provide a framework for optimal timing decisions in the presence of the trade-off 
between rewards from waiting versus risk of preemption.  
We study this game for the following reasons. First, it has a formal model and a very 
simple, closed-form optimal strategy (timing decision) that a rational player should use in 
equilibrium. This sharp prediction about behavior makes it easy to detect any deviation 
from the optimal strategy or abnormality of behavior.  
Further, the game has a rich structure and can be used as a general paradigm to study 
related psychological processes. The basic decision that a player faces in the game is 
whether to wait for a reward to grow (risk a preemption) or whether to cash out and sell 
at a sure gain (but risk the regret of knowing that gains would have been larger from 
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waiting). This trade-off requires strategic reasoning of what others will do, as well as 
managing real-time emotions (e.g., anxiety and stress), and revising a strategy based on 
feedback (learning based on reinforcement and regret). These are all interesting, 
important components that guide decision making.  
The specific goals of this study are three-fold: (1) we build on the work of BM and re-
examine the theory’s implications for optimal timing decisions, (2) we examine the 
strategic equivalence of dynamic and static implementations of the clock game, and (3) 
we test for subject learning/adaptation during the experiment.  
In a lab experiment, BM tested the theoretical predictions about timing decisions, but 
they were not borne out by the data. This might be due to their experimental design 
whereby the subjects played repeatedly with 11 other human subjects in many rounds. 
After a while, the game essentially became a repeated game.2 In the presence of naïve 
subjects, rational players would have adjusted their behavior according to others’ 
unsophisticated behavior. Or it could be just an artifact of data censoring (further 
explained later), which could have biased the results. We overcome these issues by using 
computerized rivals who employ a theory-predicted strategy; and by implementing a 
strategically equivalent form of the clock game that addresses the potential for data 
censoring. An alternative explanation for the failure of the theory to describe the data 
would be that the theory might have a missing element that is crucial to the decision 
                                                 
2 BM randomly and anonymously re-matched subjects into two different groups every trial, but it was not 
actually random. The matching was based on the order of the log-in to the experiment server—that is, after 
each trial (or round), subjects had to log in again and the first 6 people who logged in early were grouped 
together and the last 6 who logged in late were grouped together. Hence, it is possible that subjects who 
were always quick to log in were grouped together in all 45 rounds.  
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process. We investigate this possibility in our own experimental data and by re-analyzing 
the BM’s data.  
The clock game can be implemented in two different forms: dynamic and static, and we 
implemented both. Interestingly, the two versions have an identical equilibrium solution, 
which is called ‘strategic equivalence.’ We demonstrate that this strategic equivalence is 
not found in an experimental setting. Finally, although this has been ignored in BM, we 
look at the process of learning and see individuals adapt their strategy over time.  
The Structure of the Clock Game and Theoretical Predictions 
Dynamic Clock Game  
 
Here we describe the “dynamic” clock game in detail, which is the original form of the 
clock game with unobservable actions as proposed by BM. This version of the game is 
played in real clock time and hence we call it “dynamic.” For ease of explanation of the 
experiment later, we will frame the game environment as a stock market with a 
speculative bubble.  
In this game, a finite number, I, of players participate in the stock market. At the start of 
the game, all players are in the market—in a sense that they hold one share of an stock, 
and their task is to make an selling decision; i.e., when to sell the stock. Each player can 
make one and only one decision before the game (or market) ends—once they sell their 
stock, that is a final decision and they cannot buy it back.  
The price of the stock starts at 1 and exponentially increases at the rate of g; that is, at the 
period of t, the price is ݁௚௧. At any time period, sellers can privately sell their stock as 
long as the market is still open.  
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At one point t0, a speculative bubble in the price starts. t0 is a random variable that 
follows an exponential distribution3 with parameter λ, whose probability distribution 
function is ݂ሺݐ଴ሻ ൌ ߣ݁ିఒ௧బ. One interpretation of t0 is that it is the period in which the 
current stock price starts exceeding the stock’s true worth. The distribution of t0 is a 
common knowledge, but the exact value of t0 is unknown to sellers. Only after a random 
delay, do sellers receive incomplete and private information about this and learn that this 
event has happened. More specifically, seller i privately receives a signal at period ti 
indicating that t0 has happened (or the price bubble has started). ti is also a random 
variable and is uniformly distributed over the interval, [ t0, t0 + η ]. By the period t0 + η, 
everybody has received the signal, and hence η is called the ‘window of awareness.’ The 
signal arrival period is private information and sellers cannot observe others’ signal 
arrival time. 
Once K sellers have sold, the market crashes. If a seller successfully sells the stock before 
the market crash, he will receive the amount of money that is equal to the price of the 
stock at the period of selling—that is, if he sells the stock at period x, he will earn ݁௚௫. 
His selling price is not observed by others. Once the market crashes, the rest of the sellers 
who did not sell on time only receive the post-crash price, ݁௚௧బ, which is the price at the 
bubble starting period, t0. Note that a seller can be worse off if he sells too early. Selling 
before t0, say at tx, means practically losing money since if he had waited, he could have 
earned ݁௚௧బ, which is larger than ݁௚௧ೣ.  
                                                 
3 An important property of the exponential distribution is that it is memoryless. Due to this 
“memorylessness” property, each period has a constant probability of λ of being t0. 
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There are two ways the market ends (crashes): (1) once K (< I) sellers have sold, it 
crashes; (2) it ends at the period of t0 + τ* if fewer than K sellers have sold the item by 
this period. τ* is common knowledge and is assumed to be large enough to ensure players 
will not take this exogenous ending period into consideration of their selling strategy 
(Brunnermeier & Morgan 2006). If more than one seller sell exactly at the crash period, 
then a tie-breaking rule applies—one of the tied sellers will be randomly (with an equal 
probability among them) chosen to sell his item. At the end of the market, the earnings of 
all sellers are publicly announced without individual identification.  
This game structure has very nice properties, which are conducive to experimental tests. 
First, the dynamic clock game has a unique symmetric Bayesian perfect equilibrium. 
Second, the equilibrium strategy is characterized by a fixed constant. More specifically, 
in the unique symmetric equilibrium, each player (risk neutrality assumed) employs the 
following simple strategy: wait for τ periods after signal arrival and then sell, where 
߬ ൌ  ଵ௚ log ሺ
λΦሺK,  I,  ηሺλ‐gሻሻ
௚ିሺ௚ିఒሻ஍ሺ௄,   ூ,   ఎఒሻሻ and 
Φሺܽ, ܾ, ݔሻ ൌ  ሺ௕ିଵሻ!ሺ௕ି௔ିଵሻ!ሺ௔ିଵሻ! ׬ ݁௫௭ݖ௔ିଵሺ1 െ ݖሻ௕ି௔ିଵ݀ݖ
ଵ
଴  . 
The formal proof of the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium can be found in 
an older version of BM (Brunnermeier & Morgan 2006). 
Static Clock Game  
The static version of the clock game is identical to the dynamic clock game with one 
difference: the game is played in a static environment. The static clock game is to the 
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dynamic game as the first-price sealed bid auction is to the Dutch auction.4 All the 
properties of the dynamic clock game except for the dynamic structure will carry over to 
the static clock game. 
In the static clock game, all sellers are given their signal arrival time, ti at the beginning 
of the auction. Each seller is then asked to privately submit his selling time. Once all 
selling times are submitted, they are then compared and the market ending period is 
determined as the K-th earliest selling time. The K sellers with the earliest selling times 
can sell at the price of their choosing. The (I - K) sellers whose selling times are later than 
the market ending period, or who did not sell in time, receive the post-crash price, ݁௚௧బ. t0 
and ti are determined as in the dynamic game.   
Interestingly, in their revised paper (Brunnermeier & Morgan 2008), BM solve the 
equilibrium using this static structure and reach the identical equilibrium solution. In 
other words, the dynamic clock game is strategically equivalent5 to the static clock game: 
players in both types of the games should employ an equivalent strategy in equilibrium, 
which is that upon receiving the signal, wait for τ periods and sell (in the static game, 
submit the selling time which is τ periods after the signal arrival time). We test this 
theoretical isomorphism6 between the dynamic and static clock games.7 
                                                 
4 In a first-price sealed-bid auction, bidders submit their bid privately (historically, in a sealed envelope) 
and the bidder making the highest bid (hence, the name first-price) claims the object and pays the amount 
he has bid (Milgrom & Weber 1982). The Dutch auction (descending, clock) auction is an auction where 
the auctioneer begins with a very high asking price and then successively lowers the price until some bidder 
stops and claims the good for that price (Milgrom & Weber 1982) 
5 This means that the sets of strategies between the two types of  games are identical and the outcome rules 
that transform strategies into allocations are identical (Milgrom 1989). 
6 We use the term ‘isomorphism’ in a loose sense, not as is rigorously defined in game theory, and 
interchange ‘strategic equivalence’ with ‘isomorphism’.  
7 Strategic equivalence between different types of auctions is often observed in the standard forward 
auctions. In standard models, the first-price sealed bid and the Dutch auctions are strategically equivalent 
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4.2  Experimental Design and Methods 
Participants and Stimuli 
Thirty-eight subjects were recruited from UCLA and its neighborhood area (19 males, 19 
females; mean age = 20.9 ± 4.1 year; age range = 17 – 42) and twenty-five subjects were 
recruited from Caltech (21 males, 4 females; mean age = 21.3 ± 2.2 year; age range = 18 
– 27). Seven additional subjects participated in the experiment. They were excluded from 
the analysis because their response time in many static trials was too short8 or their 
submitted selling times in static trials were highly correlated with initial, default values 
(explained further in the next section), implying that those subjects might have skipped 
trials by quickly pressing the response key instead of submitting their actual selling time 
decisions and thus added noise to the data.  
Before the experiment, subjects were informed about the experiment and gave informed 
consent to participate according to a protocol approved by Institutional Review Boards of 
the University of California, Los Angeles CA (for the UCLA sessions), and of the 
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena CA (for the Caltech sessions). 
In addition to the $5 show-up fee, subjects were paid whatever they earned during the 
experiment with the conversion rate of 100 Experimental Dollars equal to 0.50 US dollar. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and assuming that each bidder knows the value to himself of the object being auctioned, the English and the 
second-price sealed-bid auctions are also strategically equivalent (Milgrom 1989). Despite the theoretical 
equivalence, lab and field experiments have found that the strategic equivalence does not hold in practice 
(Cox et al. 1982; Cox et al. 1983; Kagel et al. 1987; Kagel & Levin forthcoming; Katok & Kwasnica 2006; 
Lucking-Reiley 1999). 
8 These subjects either showed less than 2 seconds of average response time (RT) in static trials or 
responded less than a second for more than 30% of all static trials. The average RT across all other subjects 
was 6.66 seconds (SD = 2.91). 
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Stimulus presentation and the timing of all stimuli and response events were achieved 
using Matlab (www.mathworks.com) and the Psychtoolbox (www.psychtoolbox.org) on 
computers running Microsoft Windows. 
Experimental Procedure and Task 
The experimental procedure followed the basic structure of the clock game experiments 
by Brunnermeirer and Morgan (Brunnermeier & Morgan 2006, 2008). The experiment 
was framed as an asset market in which subjects made selling time (price) decisions on 
the stock they were holding. Each participant played in his own market with computer 
players programmed to follow a theory-predicted equilibrium strategy. Participants knew 
that they were playing with five computer players (i.e., I = 6), who would receive the 
same amount of information as they did and who would employ a strategy constant 
throughout the experiment. The strategy of the computer players remained unknown to 
the participants. 
An experimenter read out instructions (appendix 4.6.2) aloud while participants were 
provided with copies of the instructions to read. The figures for the instructions (appendix 
4.6.3) were displayed on the computer screen in front of them. To ensure that subjects 
understood the game structure and procedure, a quiz was administered at the end of the 
instructions. Subjects who failed the quiz (answered two or more questions incorrectly; 
see appendix 4.6.4) twice were not allowed to proceed and dismissed (n = 3). 
Each individual completed 100 trading rounds or trials—5 blocks of 10 dynamic clock 
game trials and 5 blocks of 10 static clock game trials. The dynamic blocks were 
111 
 
interleaved with the static blocks and half of the subjects started with a block of dynamic 
trials and the other half with a static round block.  
In a dynamic trial, subjects were asked to make a real-time decision as to at what period 
(price) to sell the asset they were holding. At the start of each trading round, everyone 
(the subject and five computer players) received a share of the same asset with an initial 
price of $1. This price grew exponentially at the rate of 4% in each period (i.e. g = 4%) as 
trading time periods passed in real-time. Specifically, each period lasted 250 
milliseconds. The computer screen displayed a trajectory of the price graphically as well 
as the current price numerically (figure 4.1). The current price in each time period was 
the same for all 6 sellers (the human subject and 5 computer rivals). 
 
Figure 4.1 A dynamic clock game trial. The price trajectory from the start to the 
current period is displayed in a price-period graph. The current price and period 
are numerically displayed in the upper right corner of the screen. 
 
At the start of each round, the computer determined the post-crash price, which was 
worded, in instructions to the participants, as the maximum “true value” of the asset, or 
the value when the true value stopped growing (i.e., t0). In each period, there was a 2.5% 
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probability that the true value stopped growing (i.e., λ = 2.5%).  After the true value 
stopped growing, a subject received a message (or a signal) indicating that the current 
price of the asset is above its true value; this message is delayed by an amount of time 
that is equally likely to be anywhere from 0 to 60 periods (i.e., η= 60), (figure 4.2). 
Subjects were told that the delay between the time the true value stopped growing (t0) and 
the signal arrival (ti) was randomly chosen separately for each player in each round.  
 
Figure 4.2 Subjects receive a message about the true value with a random delay.  
 
Once three or more sellers in a market sold their asset, the round ended (i.e., K = 3). At 
this time, subjects received feedback about their current earnings as well as the prices at 
which other sellers sold their asset (figure 4.3). Subject’s earnings in a dynamic round 
were determined as follows: if the subject successfully sold the asset (i.e., he was among 
the first three sellers to sell), he received the price of the asset at the time of selling. 
Otherwise, the subject received an amount equal to the maximum true value of the asset 
(post-crash price).  
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Figure 4.3 Once the market ends, subjects receive information on their earnings 
and others’ selling price and the true value (the earnings of the last three subjects 
to sell).  
In summary, the values of the parameters used in this experiment are as follows:  
(a) Number of participants: I = 6 
(b) Number of sellers necessary for market crash: K = 3 
(c) Price growth rate: g = 4% 
(d) The probability that the true value stops growing in each period: λ = 2.5% 
(e) Exogenous ending parameter: * = 300 
(f) Window of awareness:  η = 60.  
Under this set of parameter values, the equilibrium delay, τ, is 21 periods. That is, in 
equilibrium, once a subject receives a signal, he should strategically delay for 21 periods 
until he sells this asset. 
In a static trial, subjects were presented with all of the information that was revealed 
across time in the dynamic rounds, all at once. More specifically, the signal arrival time ti 
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was known to subject i at the beginning of a trial, who was then asked at what price (in 
what period) they would sell if they had received the signal in period ti. The signal arrival 
period, ti, varied between trials and was determined as in dynamic trials. The period in 
which a message arrived was shown on the computer screen. Subjects were allowed to 
explore the stock price over time by moving a cursor on the screen (figure 4.4). Once the 
cursor was placed at the desired selling time, the participants would press the enter button 
to choose that time and proceed. Once they submitted their decision, the computer 
compared the selling times of all players (a human subject and 5 computer players) and 
determined earnings as in a dynamic round—the computer first determined the time of 
market ending as the earliest period by which 3 players had sold and then the first 3 
sellers earned their selling price and the other 3 earned only the maximum true value 
(post-crash price). 
 
Figure 4.4 A static trading round. Subjects explore the price over time by 
moving the blue rectangular cursor along the horizontal bar at the bottom of the 
screen. 
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The initial position of the selling-time cursor is called an anchor and was randomized in 
every trial in order to avoid any potential anchoring effects.9 The location of the initial 
position was only recorded during the sessions at Caltech and these data were used as a 
check for subjects’ engagement in the task. Three participants at one of the Caltech 
sessions showed 40%~60% correlation between their selling times and anchor periods 
(significant at 0.005) in static trials and hence were discarded for further analysis. Their 
average RT in static trials was also less than 2 seconds. 
Design Considerations 
The use of computer players has a number of advantages, and this trick has been used in 
many experimental studies on auctions (Dorsey & Razzolini 2003; Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
& Katok 2007; Kagel & Levin 2001; Neugebauer & Selten 2006). First, we can control 
“collusive” strategies. Subjects cannot coordinate to wait longer than they would 
otherwise, and split the high payoff outside the lab. Second, participants do not face 
strategic uncertainty in regards to other players’ behavior and have no need to worry if 
common knowledge assumptions are satisfied (that is, whether other players understand 
the instructions and play accordingly or not). Without computer players, our concern was 
that the presence of some abnormal or strategically naïve subjects with out-of-
equilibrium behavior would “contaminate” others’ decisions. In this case, it would be 
necessary to isolate subjects whose behavior is suboptimal, due to limited strategic 
thinking, from those who employ suboptimal strategy out of a rational expectation of 
others’ unsophisticated behavior, which is a daunting task. Finally, using computer 
                                                 
9 In many decision making situations, an individual’s final decision or behavior is influenced by an initial 
value or a reference point. This phenomenon is called ‘anchoring’ (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). 
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opponents also prevents information leakage10 among subjects in the lab since each 
subject participates in an individual game independently from others.   
Our design permits within-subjects comparisons of the treatment effects of the two 
versions of the game, dynamic and static, which enhances the power of the statistical 
tests. Further, it rules out the possibility that any measured differences in behavior are 
due to the idiosyncrasies of a particular group (Cox et al. 1982).  
Static trials are valuable as a test bed for the strategic equivalence between the two 
different implementations of the isomorphic games. Further, an important, additional 
benefit of static trials is that all selling decisions are observable. In dynamic trials, if the 
market ends before a seller would have sold, his strategic delay (the length of waiting 
periods between the signal arrival and the selling) is either not observed or right 
censored, and this lost information could bias results. Static trials do not suffer from this 
problem. We take advantage of this fact during the analysis. 
4.3  Results 
We start with definitions of the terminology used in this section.  
Delay, an empirical measure of strategic delay , is the dependent variable of the most 
interest, and is defined as follows: In dynamic trials,  
(1) If a subject received the signal and then he sold the asset afterwards, Delay is 
uncensored and defined as the length of periods between the signal arrival period 
and the selling time;  
                                                 
10 This was indeed a problem in BM since mouse-clicking noise could serve as an auditory cue about 
selling time to other subjects. To get around this issue, they had subjects “hover” the mouse over a button 
to sell and this led to many erroneous sellings. 
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(2) If the subject sold prior to or at the signal arrival period, Delay is left-censored 
and coded as zero (left-censored at 0);  
(3) If he received the signal but did not sell prior to the market crash, Delay is right-
censored and coded as the amount of periods between the signal arrival period 
and the market ending time;  
(4) If he neither received the signal nor sold, then Delay is treated as missing and 
hence discarded. 
Although all selling decisions in static trials were indeed observed, for comparability of 
behavior in dynamic and static trials, Delay in static trials is defined in the same manner.  
Duration was defined as in BM, the length of periods from t0 to the market ending. 
Early exit is an event in which a subject sold prior to the signal arrival and which led to 
left-censored Delay.  
Success rate is the number of the trials in which a subject sold before the market ending, 
divided by the number of all trials, whether sold or not, in a given condition.  
Below we define the independent variables of relevance: 
(a) Signal indicates the signal arrival time in periods; 
(b) Condition is a categorical variable indicating a trial type (dynamic or static); 
(c) Group is a categorical variable indicating the group to which a subject belongs 
(UCLA or Caltech); 
(d) UCLA (Caltech) is a dummy variable for UCLA (Caltech): 1 if a subject 
participated in one of the UCLA (Caltech) sessions and 0 otherwise; 
(e) Dyn (Static) is a dummy variable for dynamic (static) trials; 
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(f) Experience is a dummy variable to indicate a given trial belongs to the last half of 
the experiment.  
In the following subsections, we first examine the trials where selling decisions were 
observed (the trials with left-censored and uncensored Delay)—hence, therein Delay 
means left-censored or uncensored Delay. When the trials with right-censored Delay 
were included, the qualitative aspects of the data did not change and these additional 
results are reported in the appendix (Section 4.5.1). Note that right-censored Delay could 
underestimate actual Delay, and the left-censored Delay could overestimate the actual 
Delay that could have been negative, potentially biasing the results.11 Therefore, we 
repeat all the analyses using static trials only, with a redefinition of Delay as the length of 
periods between the submitted selling time and the signal arrival time; Delayuncensored 
denotes this new definition of Delay. Note that Delayuncensored permits negative values 
when a subject sold prior to the signal arrival. Using Delayuncensored yields qualitatively 
identical to those obtained using the Delay measure. 
In theory, all sellers are ex ante identical in a sense that in equilibrium they all employ the 
same unique symmetric strategy. Hence in analyzing data, we do not distinguish the 
behavior of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd sellers as in BM. 
p-values reported herein are two sided unless noted otherwise. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.1 shows the percentage of the trials with left-/right-, uncensored Delay. 
                                                 
11 BM is aware of this censoring problem. To get around the problem, they estimated the delay measure 
using the Tobit procedure, assuming that the right-censored delay is normally distributed with mean τ. 
However, this is tautological (using τ to estimate τ) and this specification would yield an estimate in favor 
of τ.  
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Table 4.1 Percentage of trials with (un)censored Delay 
 
  All  Dynamic  Static 
Right censored  26%  25%  28% 
Uncensored  48%  49%  47% 
Left censored  9%  8%  10% 
Missing  16%  18%  15% 
Total  100%  100%  100% 
 
 
Signal Arrival Time 
Average signal arrival period was 67.55 (SD = 38.05). In dynamic trials, on average, the 
signal arrived at the period of 68.21 (SD = 37.89) and in static trials, 66. 89 (SD = 38.19). 
The difference in the signal arrival time between dynamic and static trials was marginally 
significant (paired t-test, t(62) = 1.80, p = 0.077; signed rank test, z-value = -2.77, p < 
0.01), and this slight difference was driven by the UCLA group (figure 4.5). The signal 
arrival period is the primary independent variable of interest and the difference in signal 
arrival time could possibly lead to different behavior between the two types of trials. 
Hence, we look at the data from the UCLA subjects and the Caltech subjects separately, 
as well as the pooled. However, our main qualitative results remain unchanged 
regardless. 
 
Figure 4.5 Signal arrival period by trial type and group. Error bars indicate 
standard errors. *** p < 0.001, n.s.: not significant, paired t-test. 
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Success Rate 
The success rates between dynamic (M = 0.57, SD = 0.13) and static trials (M = 0.57, SD 
= 0.14) were not significantly different (paired t-test, t(62) = -0.17, p = 0.87; signed rank 
test, z-value = -0.003, p = 0.997), but they were significantly correlated (figure 4.6, r(61) 
= 0.59, p < 4.24 × 10-7). The success rates of dynamic and static trials were not 
significantly different between the UCLA and the Caltech subjects (dynamic trials: two-
sample t-test, t(61) = -0.64, p = 0.52; static trials: two-sample t-test, t(61) = -1.44, p = 
0.15) 
 
Figure 4.6 Scatter plot of success rates in dynamic and static trials. 
 
Durations 
Durations in static trials and in dynamic trials were significantly different (figure 4.7A; 
paired t-test, t(62) = -2.68, p < 0.0096; signed rank test, z-value = -2.52, p < 0.012). They 
were also shorter than the theory predicts (figure 4.7B). Figure 4.7B shows simulated 
durations assuming that subjects had played an equilibrium strategy given the same signal 
arrival periods. The actual duration was slightly shorter than predicted, but the difference 
was significant in dynamic trials (paired t-test, t(62) = -6.48, p < 0.0001; signed rank test, 
z-value = -5.15, p < 0.0001) and in static trials (paired t-test, t(62) = -4.63, p < 0.0001; 
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signed rank test, z-value = -4.12, p < 0.0001). Mean (median) Durations were not 
different between the UCLA and the Caltech subjects in dynamic trials (two-sample t-
test, t(61) = 1.53, p < 0.13; rank sum test, z-value = -0.75, p < 0.45) and in static trials 
(two-sample t-test, t(61) = 1.71, p < 0.09; rank sum test, z-value = -1.13, p < 0.26). 
 (A) (B) 
Figure 4.7 Difference in average Duration between dynamic and static trials. 
The y-axis scale is adjusted to display the difference in means. (A) Duration data 
from the actual subjects. (B) Simulated durations from an equilibrium strategy. 
Error bars indicate standard errors.  
 
 
Difference in Delay between Dynamic and Static Trials 
Mean (median) Delay was greater in static trials than in dynamic trials (figure 4.8A; 
paired t-test, t(62) = -5.32, p < 7.57 × 10-7; signed rank test, z-value = -4.40, p < 0.0001). 
Delays in both types of trials were significantly lower than the theory predicted delay,  = 
21 periods (dynamic trials: one-sample t-test, t(62) = -18.86, p < 2.29 × 10-27; static trials: 
one-sample t-test, t(62) = -10.37, p < 3.55 × 10-15; figures 4.8A and 4.9). This pattern did 
not change when the trials with right-censored Delay were included (figures A4.1 and 
A4.2).  
A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with one within-subject factor, Condition, 
with two levels (dynamic or static) and one between-subject factor, Group, with two 
levels (UCLA or Caltech) was conducted to evaluate the effect of static trials and groups 
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on Delay. Significant main effects were observed for Condition, F(1, 120) = 14.12, p < 
0.0002, and for Group, F(1, 120) = 11.66, p < 0.0009, but their interaction did not reach 
statistical significance (F(1, 120) = 0.13, p < 0.72). Post hoc t-tests showed that Delay for 
the UCLA subjects was significantly lower than that for the Caltech subjects in dynamic 
trials (two sample t-test, t(61) = -3.73, p < 4.20 × 10-4), but not in static trials (two sample 
t-test, t(61) = -1.02, p = 0.31) (figure 4.8B).  
(A) (B) 
 
Figure 4.8 Difference in average Delay between dynamic and static trials. 
Dashed lines in red indicate the theory-predicted delay,  = 21. Error bars 
indicate standard errors. (A) Delay by trial type. (B) Delay by group and trial 
type. 
 
Figure 4.9 Distribution of individual average Delay between dynamic and static 
trials.  
Although Delayuncensored (M = 19.23, Med = 16.76, SD = 10.35) was not significantly 
different from  = 21 in a parametric test (one sample t-test, t(62) = -1.36, one sided p = 
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0.18), it was significantly lower than  in a non-parametric test (one-sample signed-rank 
test, z-value = -2.27, p = 0.02), which is a more appropriate test to apply given non-
normality of the data (figure 4.10). Furthermore, while Delayuncensored for the Caltech 
group (M = 16.80, Med = 15.56, SD = 5.62) was significantly lower than  (one-sample t-
test, t(24) = -3.73, p < 0.001; one-sample signed-rank test, z-value = -3.00, p < 0.003), in 
the UCLA subjects it was not significantly different from  (M = 20.82, Med = 18.25, SD 
= 12.34, one-sample t-test, t(24) = -0.09, p = 0,93; one-sample signed-rank test, z-value = 
-0.70, p = 0.49). 
 
Figure 4.10 Distribution of individual average Delayuncensored in static trials. 
Signal Dependence of Delay 
Although the dynamic and static clock games are strategically equivalent, this predicted 
equivalence was not borne out by the data. Figure 4.11 shows scatter plots of Delay 
against the signal arrival time in dynamic and static trials. To investigate if there is any 
systematic difference in Delay across time, we further binned the signal arrival periods 
into 6 bins, by 25 periods starting from 0, except for the last bin—due to rarity of the 
observations, signal periods over 125 were binned all together—and then compared 
Delay between dynamic and static trials in each of the 6 time bins. Delay decreased as a 
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function of the signal arrival time in both dynamic and static trials. Further, in each time 
bin mean Delay in static trials was longer than in dynamic trials (figure 4.12). This 
pattern was preserved when the trials with right-censored Delay were included (figure 
A4.3). 
 
Figure 4.11 Distribution of Delay against the signal arrival period by trial type. 
Note that negative Delays are censored at 0. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Delay as a function of the signal arrival period. Delay decreases as a 
signal arrives later. Error bars indicate standard errors. *** p < 0.001, * p < 0.05 
(paired t-test, one sided). 
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Table 4.2 Results of random-effects Tobit regression analyses for Delay 
censored at 0 (subject random-effects incorporated) 
 
Variable   A   B   C   D   E   F  
Constant   30.724†  29.15† 28.892† 28.612† 30.572†   29.418†
(0.430)  (0.398) (0.472) (0.486) (0.430)  (0.672)
Signal   ‐0.196†   ‐0.194† ‐0.194† ‐0.190† ‐0.204†   ‐0.202†
(0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)  (0.009)
UCLA*Static    3.231† 3.651†   4.537†
 (0.420) (0.442)  (0.906)
Caltech*Dyn    0.521 ‐4.902†   ‐1.768* 
 (0.573) (0.799)  (0.996)
Caltech*Static    2.580† 1.461
 (0.576) (0.971)
Signal*UCLA*Static    ‐0.009 ‐0.02
 (0.010) (0.013)
Signal*Caltech*Dyn    0.01 0.038†   0.036** 
 (0.007) (0.011)  (0.013)
Signal*Caltech*Static    0.016 0.017
 (0.010) (0.012)
Caltech   ‐0.25   
(0.491)   
Static    2.787† 3.816†  
(0.320) (0.651)    
                   
Log likelihood   ‐11527.73  ‐11498.79  ‐11488.36  ‐11491.68  ‐11491.21  ‐11477.68 
Left‐censored at Delay = 0   584             
Uncensored   3012         
Right‐censored     0         
Included Observations      3596                
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. † p < 0.0001, ** p < 0.01. 
 
We further examined if there is any group specific effect on Delay by conducting Tobit 
regression analysis (Greene 2002) for Delay (table 4.2). The structure of the Tobit models 
in this analysis is expressed as 
ܦ݈݁ܽݕ௜ ൌ  ൜  ܦ݈݁ܽݕ௜
כ   ݂݅ ܦ݈݁ܽݕ௜כ  ൐ 0 
   0           ݂݅ ܦ݈݁ܽݕ௜כ ൑ 0  
where  ܦ݈݁ܽݕ௜כ ൌ  ݔ௜ߚ ൅ ݁௜ ,  ݁௜ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪሻ, xi is a vector of independent variables. 
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Delay* is a latent variable that is observed for values greater than 0 and is censored for 
values less than or equal to 0.  
The signal arrival time remained significant across various model specifications, and 
Delay decreased as the signal arrival was delayed. Both of the UCLA and the Caltech 
groups waited longer to sell in static trials than in dynamic trials, although on average the 
length of delay in static trials was longer in the Caltech group. Furthermore, the Caltech 
subjects exhibited less sensitivity of Delay to the signal arrival period in dynamic trials 
than in static trials. A similar pattern was found when the trials with right-censored Delay 
were included (table A4.1). 
Delayuncensored also decreased as a function of the signal arrival period (figure 4.13), 
although the length of delay was longer due to the inclusion of the long delays that were 
previously excluded.  
 
Figure 4.13 Delayuncensored as a function of the signal arrival period. 
Furthermore, Delayuncensored showed very different behavior between the two groups than 
shown by the previous analyses (figure 4.14 and table 4.3). The Caltech subjects showed 
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less variance in Delay over all signal periods compared to the UCLA subjects. Caltech 
subjects’s average length of Delayuncensored was shorter and the decrease in their 
Delayuncensored measure was less sensitive to the signal delay. In both subject groups, the 
signal arrival period was a highly significant predictor of Delayuncensored, but the effect of 
the signal arrival period differed between the two groups—it was smaller (in an absolute 
sense) for the Caltech participants than for the UCLA participants. 
(A) (B) 
 
Figure 4.14 Scatter plot of Delayuncensored versus the signal arrival period. Straight 
lines indicate fitted regression lines from B in table 4.3. (A) UCLA subjects. (B) 
Caltech subjects. 
 
Table 4.3 Results of random-effects regression analyses of Delayuncensored (subject 
random-effects incorporated) 
 
Variable   A   B  
Constant   40.813†  45.875† 
(1.726)  (1.787) 
Signal   ‐0.299†  ‐0.374† 
(0.010)  (0.013) 
Caltech   ‐4.019  ‐15.280† 
(2.547)  (2.798) 
Signal * Caltech     0.168† 
(0.019) 
R2    0.217 0.234 
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Included Observations   3150 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. † p < 0.0001 
 
Effect of Experience on Delay 
We examined whether subjects’ selling strategy was adaptive over time. As a first 
attempt, we compared behavior in the first half of the experiment (trial number 1~50) and 
the last half of the experiment (trial number 51~100), by which point substantial learning 
and adaptation would have occurred. The dynamic vs. static difference in Delay was 
more pronounced in the first half of the game; Delay in the static case was substantially 
longer in each time bin as compared to the dynamic case. In later trials, the difference 
was reduced, but still persisted and appeared to stabilize (figure 4.15). Regardless of 
experience, however, Delay decreased as a function of the signal time.  
 (A) (B) 
 
Figure 4.15 Delay as a function of the signal arrival period, moderated by 
experience. (A) First 50 trials. (B) Last 50 trials. *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p 
<0.05, n.s.: not significant (paired t-test, one sided) 
 
While the length of delay was generally longer, the same pattern was found when the 
Delayuncensored measure was used (figure 4.16). 
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 (A) (B) 
Figure 4.16 Delayuncensored as a function of the signal arrival period, moderated by 
experience. (A) First 50 trials only. (B) Last 50 trials only.  
Further regression analyses of Delayuncensored revealed that significant learning effects 
were found in both groups (table 4.4). While the signal arrival time remained a 
significantly predictor of Delayuncensored throughout the experiment, its effect was 
moderated by experience in both groups—Delayuncensored decreased by a smaller amount 
in response to one unit of signal delay in later trials than in earlier trials. 
Table 4.4 Results of regression analyses of Delayuncensored on the signal arrival 
time and experience 
  UCLA subjects only     Caltech subjects only 
Variable  A  B  C     D  E  F 
Constant  46.502†  46.103†  50.864†    29.858†  31.004†  31.270† 
(1.454)  (1.276)  (1.764)    (0.760)  (0.701)  (1.000) 
Signal  ‐0.382†  ‐0.392†  ‐0.444†    ‐0.211†  ‐0.230†  ‐0.233† 
(0.017)  (0.017)  (0.022)    (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Experience  ‐0.226    ‐9.897†    2.073**    ‐0.521 
(1.218)    (2.544)    (0.730)    (1.402) 
Signal*Experience    0.030
  0.146†      0.033†  0.039* 
  (0.016)  (0.034)      (0.009)  (0.018) 
                       
R‐square  0.2168  0.2183  0.2245    0.3077  0.3102  0.3103 
Adjusted R‐square  0.216  0.2174  0.2232    0.3066  0.3091  0.3086 
F‐statistic  262.58  264.84  182.92    277.13  280.42  186.86 
Prob(F‐statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Included 
Observations  1900  1900  1900     1250  1250  1250 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. † p < 0.0001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05,  p < 0.1 
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We also defined a measure of deviation from the equilibrium to see if subjects’ delay 
strategy was adaptive to the equilibrium over time. This measure, denoted by δ, the 
standard deviation of Delay from , was defined as ߜ ൌ ඥሺܦ݈݁ܽݕ௜ െ  ߬ሻଶ. Most of the 
subjects, on average, exhibited higher δ in the first half of the experiment than in the 
second half (figure 4.17) 
(A) (B) 
 
Figure 4.17 Scatter plot of average δ’s for the first and the last halves of the 
experiment. (A) Dynamic trials. (B) Static trials. Blue lines indicate 45˚ line. 
 
A two-way within-subjects ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the effect of static trials 
and experience on δ. The within-subjects factors were Condition (dynamic vs. static) and 
Experience (first half vs. last half). Significant main effects were found for Condition 
(F(1, 244) = 6.65, p < 0.02), and for Experience (F(1, 244) = 29.75, p < 1.20 x 10-7). 
However, there was no interaction between Condition and Experience (F(1, 244) = 0.97, 
p < 0.33; figure 4.18). Posthoc t-tests showed that mean δ's in the first half of the trials 
were significantly greater than in the last half of the trials in both dynamic (paired t-test, 
t(62) = 6.14, p < 6.75 x 10-8 ; signed rank test, z-value = -5.09, p < 3.64 x 10-7) and static 
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trials (paired t-test, t(62) = 5.78, p < 1.80 x 10-6; signed rank test, z-value = -4.60, p < 
4.21 x 10-6). δ’s for the first and the last half of the trials in the static condition were 
lower than those in the dynamic condition (first half: paired t-test, t(62) = 2.84, p < 0.01; 
signed rank test, z-value = -2.76, p < 0.01, last half: paired t-test, t(62) = 2.15, p < 0.05; 
signed rank test, z-value = -2.13, p < 0.05). 
 
 
Figure 4.18 Deviation measure δ by trial type (Dynamic vs. Static) and 
experience (First vs. Last half of the trials). 
 
There was a significant main effect for Group (UCLA vs. Caltech) on δ in both dynamic 
and static trials, but the interaction between Group and Experience was only found in 
static trials (figure 4.19). In dynamic trials, both of the UCLA and the Caltech subjects 
showed diminished deviations over time, but the Caltech subjects deviated significantly 
less than the UCLA subjects throughout the experiment. However, in static trials, the 
UCLA subjects’ δ was substantially reduced as they gained more experience and it was 
not significantly different from the Caltech subjects’ deviation in the second half of the 
trials. 
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Figure 4.19 Interactions between trial type, experience, and group on deviation 
measure δ. Red (blue) lines indicate UCLA (Caltech) subjects. Solid (dashed) 
lines indicate dynamic (static) trials. 
 
Further, we defined δuncensored using Delayuncensored in static trials only as follows: 
2
, )(   iuncensoreduncensored Delay . 
δuncensored’s for the first half of the trials in static trials  (M = 18.59, SD = 4.31) were lower 
that for the last half (M = 14.42 SD = 3.80) (paired t-test, t(62) = 4.74, p < 1.31 x 10-5; 
signed rank test, z-value = -4.31, p < 1.66 x 10-5). A two-way ANOVA with a within-
subjects factor, Experience, and a between-subjects factor, Caltech, showed that there 
were significant main effects of Caltech and Experience on δuncensored (Group: F(1, 120) = 
7.07, p < 0.009, Experience: F(1, 120) = 5.77, p < 0.018), but no interaction between 
Caltech and Experience (F(1, 120) = 0.39, p < 0.535). 
Posthoc regression analyses (table 4.5) revealed that while controlling for the signal 
arrival time, the trial number was negatively correlated with δuncensored, implying that the 
deviation from equilibrium diminished over time as the subjects obtained more 
experience. The group difference was also observed: the UCLA subjects showed a higher 
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deviation to start with but it was substantially reduced over time relative to the Caltech 
subjects.  
Table 4.5 Results of regression analyses of δuncensored on the signal arrival period 
and the trial number 
 
 Variable  UCLA only  Caltech only 
Constant  21.035†  9.008† 
(1.402)  (0.761) 
Signal  0.061†  0.061† 
(0.014)  (0.007) 
Trial #  ‐0.212†  ‐0.055† 
(0.035)  (0.021) 
        
R‐square  0.0290  0.0541 
Adjusted R‐square  0.0280  0.0526 
F‐statistic  0.0280  35.69 
Prob(F‐statistic)  0.0001  0.0001 
Included 
Observations  1900   1250 
Note: 1) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. † p < 0.0001 
2) Trial # is the trial number and ascends in actual calendar time. 
3) The interaction between Signal and Trial # was not significant and thus 
not included. 
 
Table 4.6 Random-effects logistic regression of early exit on the signal arrival 
period, Experience, and Condition (subject random-effects incorporated) 
Variable  Coefficients  Std. Err.  z‐stat  p‐value 
Signal  0.045  0.002  25.59  0.0001 
Experience  ‐1.503  0.127  ‐11.81  0.0001 
Condition  0.508  0.117  4.33  0.0001 
Constant  ‐5.951  0.257  ‐23.13  0.0001 
Log likelihood  ‐1095.28       
Number of Groups  63       
Included Observations  5249       
Wald Chi2 test stat. =  684.61  p‐value =  0.0001   
 
Note: The dependent variable was a dummy variable for early exits.  
The trials with missing Delay were not included. 
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Although early exits should not occur in theory, we observed early exits in 9.3% of the 
total trials (584 incidents out of 6278). A logistic regression analysis (table 4.6) revealed 
that the subjects were more likely to sell before receiving the signal as the signal arrived 
later. The probability of early exit was reduced in later trials and was higher in static 
trials than in dynamic trials (figure 4.20). 
 
Figure 4.20 Probability of early exit as a function of Signal, Condition and 
Experience.  
 
Individual Differences in Sensitivity to Signal Arrival vs. Risk 
Preference 
In this subsection, we report preliminary results on the relationship between strategic 
delay and risk attitude. The estimates for risk aversion parameters for 13 Caltech subjects 
who participated in our study were obtained from Frydman et al. (Frydman et al. 2009). 
In Frydman et al. study, individual risk attitude was measured by empirically estimating 
exponents, ρ+ and ρ-, of the utility function for money of the form 
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A smaller ρ+ (ρ-) represents more risk aversion (seeking) over gains (losses). 
 (A) (B) 
 
Figure 4.21 Risk aversion measures, + and -, versus  coefficients from the 
individual regression models (A) The red line is a fitted regression line, + = 1.60 
+ 2.03, R2 = 0.12, F(1, 11) = 1.57, p< 0.24. (B) The red line is a regression line, 
- = 1.85 + 2.94, R2 = 0.23, F(1, 11) = 3.24, p< 0.10.  
 
β is a slope coefficient for Signal in the individual regression model of Delayuncensored on 
Signal and a constant. β represents sensitivity of subjects’ strategic delay to the signal 
arrival time in static trials. For most of the subjects, β was negative, which implies the 
subjects waited less before selling as the signal arrived later. A more negative (steeper) β 
means a greater decrease in strategic delay in response to one period of signal arrival 
delay. A β value of zero means a subject waited for a fixed length of periods after the 
signal before selling, regardless of the signal arrival time, as the theory predicted. Due to 
an insufficient amount of data, β was only modestly correlated with ρ+ (r(11) = 0.35, p = 
0.24), but without an outlier on the upper right corner, the correlation was significant 
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(r(10) = 0.64, p = 0.025). β was significantly correlated with ρ- at a 10% significance 
level (r(10) = 0.48, p = 0.099). 
4.4  Re-analyzing the BM data 
In this section, for the purpose of comparison with our data, we re-analyze and report 
results from the BM data on the unobservable treatment, all of which were not previously 
investigated. The unobservable treatment has an identical structure to the dynamic trials 
in our experiment except for different parameter values. In the original BM experiment’s 
unobservable treatment, there were 6 experimental sessions and 12 human subjects 
participated in each session. In every trial, there were 2 independent stock markets; 6 
subjects participated in one and the rest of them in the other. Each session consisted of 45 
trials (called “rounds” in BM). Each experimental period lasted a half second in real time. 
The following parameter values were used for the experiment:  
(a) Number of participants: I = 6 
(b) Number of sellers necessary for market crash: K = 3 
(c) Price growth rate: g = 2% 
(d) The probability that the true value stops growing in each period: λ = 1% 
(e) Exogenous ending parameter: τ* = 200 
(f) Window of awareness:  η = 90.  
Under this parameter set, the equilibrium strategic delay τ is 23 periods. 
Prior to analysis, we discarded observations in which selling occurs within the first 10 
periods after the start of the trial, as in BM. For comparability with our results, we did not 
distinguish sellers according to the order of their signal receiving time. All the definitions 
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of the variables remain the same. Herein only trials with uncensored and left-censored 
delay (trials with successful selling) were analyzed. 
As shown in our data, mean Delay was shorter than the prediction, τ = 23, in all sessions 
(figure 4.22A) and most of the subjects exhibited mean Delay that is significantly shorter 
than 23 periods (one sample t-test, t(71) = -18.81, p < 2.74 × 10-29; signed rank test, z-
value = -7.33, p < 2.23 × 10-13; figure 4.22B). 
(A) (B) 
 
Figure 4.22 Average Delay. (A) Delay in different sessions. A dashed line in red 
indicates the theory-predicted delay,  = 23. Error bars indicate standard errors. 
(B) Histogram of Delay. Bin center: even numbers, starting at 2 and ending at 26; 
bin size: 2. 
 
Delay was also dependent on the signal arrival time and was negatively correlated with 
the signal arrival time (figure 4.23, table 4.7). Note that the coefficient for the signal 
arrival time in the Tobit model (-0.209 in table 4.7) is very close to those in our data 
(−0.190 ~ −0.204; see table 4.2). 
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Figure 4.23 Delay as a function of the signal arrival period. Error bars indicate 
standard errors. X-axis: signal arrival period where 1 indicates signal arriving 
between 0 and 25; 2 between 26 and 50; 3 between 51 and 75; 4 between 76 and 
100; 5 between 101 between 125; 6 between 126 and 150; 7 between 151 and 
175; 8 between 176 and 200; 9 from 201 onwards. 
 
Table 4.7 Results of random-effects Tobit regression analyses of Delay on the 
signal arrival time (subject random-effects incorporated) 
 
Dependent Variable     Delay       
Variable  Coefficients Std. Err. z‐stat p‐value 
Signal  ‐0.209 0.007 ‐29.11 0.0001 
Constant  36.667 0.794 46.19  0.0001 
Log likelihood  ‐4399.32      
Number of Groups  72      
Wald Chi2 test statistics = 847.16  p‐value = 0.0001    
Left‐censored Observations  452    
Uncensored Observations  1055    
Included Observations  1507    
 
Further, we examined the effect of learning on Delay. Regardless of experience, the 
signal arrival time remained as a significant predictor of Delay (figure 4.24, 4.25 and 
table 4.8). However, Delay increased in the last 25 trials compared to the first 20 trials 
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(figure 4.25 and table 4.8) as observed in our data (see Delays the dynamic trials in figure 
4.15). 
 
Figure 4.24 Scatter plot of Delay and the signal arrival time by experience. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.25 Delay as a function of the signal arrival period, moderated by 
experience. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.02, * p <0.07, n.s.: not significant (paired t-test, 
one-sided). X-axis: signal arrival period where 1 indicates signal arriving 
between 0 and 30; 2 between 31 and 60; 3 between 61 and 90; 4 between 91 and 
120; 5 between 121 and 150; 6 between 151 and 180; 7 from 181 onwards. 
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Table 4.8 Results of random-effects Tobit regression analyses of Delay on the 
signal arrival time and experience (subject random-effects incorporated) 
 
Variable   A   B  
Constant   34.973†  34.342† 
(0.872)  (1.118) 
Signal  ‐0.211†   ‐.202† 
(0.007)  (0.011) 
Experience  2.907†  4.143* 
(0.697)  ( 1.432) 
Signal * Experience   
‐.0139 
(0.014) 
           
Log likelihood  ‐4388.37 ‐4388.93 
Number of Groups  72 72 
Wald Chi2 stat. (p‐value)  867.93 (<0.001)  870.51 (<0.001) 
     
Left‐censored Observations  452 452 
Uncensored Observations  1055 1055 
Included Observations   1507 1507 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. † p < 0.0001, * p < 0.005. 
 
The deviation measure δ increased as a function of the signal arrival time, but decreased 
in later trials (table 4.9). 
 
Table 4.9 Results of random-effects regression analyses of δ on the signal arrival 
period and the trial number (subject random-effects incorporated) 
Dependent Variable    δ      
Variable  Coefficients Std. Err. z‐stat p‐value 
Signal  0.038 0.002 15.82 0.0001 
Trial #  ‐0.023 0.006 ‐3.53  0.0001 
Constant  14.235 0.514 27.71 0.0001 
R2  0.1427      
Number of Groups  72      
Wald Chi2 test statistics = 260.86  p‐value = 0.0001    
Included Observations  1507    
 
Note: The interaction between Signal and Trial # was not significant and 
thus not included. 
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In summary, despite differences in design and procedures (e.g., human subjects 
competing against each other instead of computerized rivals; different parameter values), 
the BM data showed qualitative results similar to ours.  
4.5  Discussion and Conclusions 
We have presented four major findings that are not explained by existing theory. First, 
the subjects’ strategic delay decreased as a function of the signal arrival period, despite 
the theoretical prediction of a fixed delay, independent of the signal arrival time. Second, 
the theoretical isomorphism was inconsistent with the experimental data: the subjects 
consistently delayed less in the dynamic clock game than in the static game. Third, we 
found that the subjects’ strategy evolved as they gained more experience. Fourth, albeit 
preliminary and not conclusive, there appeared to be a relationship between risk 
preference and strategic delay.  
Regardless of group, condition, or experience, the length of strategic delay was 
negatively correlated with the signal arrival time, contrary to theory. This pattern was 
persistent after a significant amount of experience, so this rules out the possibility that the 
effect is solely attributable to subjects’ mistakes. This was true when human subjects 
competed against other human participants (as in the BM data) or when they played 
against computer players employing a theory-predicted strategy. The use of computer 
players precludes the possibility that this pattern is attributable to the best response of the 
sophisticated subjects to the suboptimal strategy of the naïve. However, one could still 
argue that the signal dependence might have been caused by subjects’ false belief about 
computer players’ strategy (the strategy was unknown to the subjects). This possibility 
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could be tested by conducting an experiment where the subjects know the computer 
players’ strategy. Alternatively, the signal dependence might be due to a misperception 
about the bubble starting time (or generating process), whose memoryless property might 
not be intuitive. This could be tested by using a different generating process for bubbles 
such as a uniform distribution. 
The signal dependence might also be attributable to subjects’ risk aversion. In this game, 
the decision to be made in every period is a gamble between reaping the sure payoff by 
selling immediately or waiting for another period to get a risky but (exponentially) higher 
reward. One possible heuristics that could have been used is as follows: When the market 
is still open and a subject has not received his signal yet, he can think of two salient 
possibilities: the event t0 has not happened yet (hence, everyone is getting their signal 
late); or the event t0 has occurred but he happens to be the unlucky one who has a long 
delay between the event t0 and the signal arrival. When he is in a later time period, the 
probability of the former event decreases and the probability of the latter increases. 
Although the size of reward exponentially increases as a function of time, it might have 
not been enough to compensate for the subject’s risk-aversion. Recall that the theoretical 
equilibrium strategy was derived with an assumption of risk neutrality. The possibility 
that risk aversion may be the cause for decreasing delay against the signal time is 
modestly evidenced by the preliminary findings on the correlation between the β 
coefficient and the risk aversion measure ρ. However, more data would be necessary to 
make a conclusive argument or perhaps, the risk aversion parameter could be estimated 
from the current data by way of simulations.  
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A more interesting finding is that the strategic delay is shorter in the dynamic condition 
than in the static condition, controlling for the signal arrival time and experience. 
One possibility is that given time constraints, reasoning and strategic computations in 
dynamic trials were not as precise as in static trials and led to more erroneous decisions. 
If this were the case, this error should be diminished as the subject gain more experience. 
Indeed, in later trials the dynamic and static differences were attenuated, but did not 
disappear and remained significant in later trials, by which point the subjects would have 
acquired substantial experience. This needs further investigation in experiments by 
manipulating clock-times of one experimental period to see if the dynamic vs. static 
differences disappear as the clock-time length of a period becomes longer, or by 
manipulating cognitive loads in static trials (giving distractions or extra tasks such as 
memorizing phone numbers, applying time pressure). 
One could argue that the reason for earlier selling times in the dynamic condition is that 
there is an implicit cost of waiting. If the subjects had wanted to finish the experiment 
earlier to do something else or just for leisure, every second they waited could have 
incurred an implicit cost—an opportunity cost or a shadow price of waiting. However, 
because they were competing with the computer rivals, they could not actually speed up 
the experiment as they would have wished. Had they sold early in order to terminate the 
round, they would have still had to wait until the other two computer players sold, not 
earning as much. Furthermore, had there been better opportunities to earn rewards, they 
would have not shown up for the experiment in the first place. Also, they could have 
actually sped up the static trials by keeping on pressing the enter key and submitting the 
randomly selected anchor values in every static round. However, most of the subjects 
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indeed took time to explore and submit their own selling times, and this was evidenced 
by the fact that their selling times were uncorrelated with the default anchor values.12 In 
addition, note that the average delay signal for each time bin in the dynamic case actually 
increased, rather than decreasing in later trials. This seems inconsistent with the shadow 
price argument since by then, distracted subjects (by other fun outside activities) most 
likely would have been even more bored of playing the same game over 50 times (which 
means increased shadow price). 
Different kinds of implicit costs from waiting are possible. One such disutility of waiting 
(or utility of early quitting) might come from timing of uncertainty resolution. People 
prefer resolution of uncertainty earlier than later (Mossin 1969; Wu 1999) because of its 
informational value that allows them to psychologically and physically better plan prior 
to outcome delivery. The shorter delay in dynamic trials might be due to this preference 
for the earlier resolution of uncertainty.  
Early selling might have reduced some other psychological toll on the subjects. Recall 
that in dynamic trials, a subject makes a flow of decisions between selling now or waiting 
another period in every period, in a faced-paced environment, under time pressure—each 
period only lasts a quarter second. Participating in a rapidly progressing, dynamic game 
                                                 
12 On a side note, this kind of waiting game could be quite engaging. In Cox et al. (Cox et al. 1982), they 
compared the Dutch auction with the first-price sealed bid auction using lab experiments to test the 
strategic equivalence between the two mechanisms. They found that the prices in the Dutch auction were 
lower than those in the first-price auction. One of their explanations of this discrepancy was that subjects 
got additional utility, the “utility-of-suspense” from playing the Dutch auction “waiting game”, and hence 
they waited longer, decreasing the prices. This was based on many subjects’ comments that they enjoyed 
the Dutch auction experiment more than the other auction formats because of the “suspense of waiting”. In 
personal conversations, some of the subjects in this study also made similar comments. 
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can be stressful, anxiety provoking, and make one feel “out of control.”13 Decision to 
wait means another decision in the next period, and this might have come at a 
psychological cost such as stress or anxiety, resulting in the shorter delay in dynamic 
trials14. This conjecture could be tested by inducing higher stress and anxiety levels 
(Porcelli & Delgado 2009)—inducing anxiety in the dynamic case only would further 
reduce the delay, and anxiety in the static case only would decrease the gap between the 
two conditions. If empirically proven, a model incorporating risk aversion and distaste for 
anxiety built in the utility function could provide a more accurate description of timing 
decision making.  
Lastly, we have sufficient data to study learning. Although it is not discussed here, it 
would be interesting to fit different types of learning models, reinforcement-based or 
regret-based, to see how the strategic delay is adapted over time. 
  
                                                 
13 Jap (2003), in field interviews with suppliers participating in reverse auctions, found that “the 
compressed time frame of open-bid auctions creates a stressful context for the supplier and many suppliers 
complained that the format prevented them from carefully considering price bids and gave them a sense of 
being ‘out of control.’”  
14 Wood and Schweitzer (Wood & Schweitzer 2009) in their experiments induced different levels of 
anxiety (high vs. low) and found negotiators experiencing high levels of anxiety make steeper concessions 
and exit bargaining situations earlier. 
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4.6  Appendix for Chapter 4 
4.6.1  Additional Results 
 
Figure A4.1 Difference in average Delay between dynamic and static trials. The 
trials with right-/left-censored or uncensored Delays were included. A dashed 
line indicates a theory-predicted delay,  = 21. Error bars indicate standard errors. 
Paired t-test, t(62) = -5.46, p < 8.93 x 10-7; signed rank test, z-value = -
4.57, p < 0.0001. 
 
 
Figure A4.2 Distribution of individual average Delay between dynamic and 
static trials. The trials with right-/left-censored or uncensored Delays were 
included. 
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Figure A4.3 Delay as a function of signal arrival period. Delay decreases as a 
signal arrives late. The trials with right-/left-censored or uncensored Delays were 
included. Error bars indicate standard errors. ***p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, n.s.: not 
significant (paired t-test, one sided). 
 
Dependent Variable  Delay       
Included Observations  5249     
Variable  Coefficients  Std. Err. z‐stat  p‐value 
Signal  ‐0.250  0.006 ‐42.62  0 
Condition  2.729  0.413 6.6  0 
Constant  30.836  0.477 64.59  0 
Log likelihood  ‐13721.039     
Pseudo R‐square  0.061         
Left‐censored at Delay = 0  584    
Uncensored    3012    
Right‐censored     1653      
 
Table A4.1 Results of censored (normal) regression analyses for Delay. The 
trials with right-/left-censored or uncensored Delays were included 
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4.6.2  Instructions 
Instructions (A) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment on the economics of investment decision 
making. By participating, you have already earned a $5 show-up fee. If you follow the 
instructions carefully you may be able to make additional money that will be paid to you 
at the end of the experiment privately, in cash. The dollar amounts mentioned below (and 
on your screens) are ‘experimental dollars.’ We will use a fixed conversion rate to 
convert experimental dollars to real cash. The conversion rate is 100 Experimental 
Dollars = 0.50 US Dollar 
 
You are about to make selling decisions 100 times in a row. Each round represents one 
trading round. You will be paired with 5 other computer players, who are also sellers, in 
every round. Note that you are NOT playing with other human participants in the room. 
To make sure you understand the procedure, please complete the quiz following these 
instructions. If you cannot answer the quiz questions yourself (with a little guidance from 
us) you will not be allowed to proceed. Please see the power point slides in front of you 
for the figures referred to below.  
 
Half of the rounds will be played in a dynamic condition and the other half in a static 
condition. We will explain these two conditions next.  
 
Dynamic Trading Rounds 
In a dynamic trading round, your job is to decide in real time when to sell an asset you 
are holding. At the start of each trading round, everyone gets one share of the same asset. 
The price of the asset begins at $ 1 (figure 1) and grows exponentially as trading time 
periods pass (figure 2).  
 
Each period lasts 250 milliseconds. In every period you are making a real-time decision 
about whether to sell or whether to wait. When you decide to sell your asset, press the 
ENTER key. Once you have decided to sell, you have no more decisions to make—you 
just wait until the trading round ends. That is, you make one and only one selling decision 
in each round. 
 
The price of the asset increases by 4% in each trading period. You will see the price 
increasing on your computer screen—graphically in the price-period plot at the center of 
the screen. The graph of prices is shown in the center of the screen (figure 3) and the 
numerical price is shown in the top right corner (figure 4). The current price is the same 
for all sellers (you and five computer players). 
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It is possible that the price graph will go out of the top of the screen in a very long round 
(figure 5). This is normal and does not change anything about your decisions. Even if the 
graph hits the top of the screen, the current price will continue to rise and is displayed on 
the top right of the screen. 
 
There are two ways a trading round can end: 
(1) Once 3 players have all decided to sell; or 
(2) The trading round reaches 300 periods after the true value (explained below) of the 
asset has stopped growing, even though fewer than three players have sold. 
 
These rules mean that among the 6 players (including you and five other computer 
players), only 3 players can actually sell their stock before the round ends. If you sell 
before the round ends, you earn an amount in $ equal to the price at which you sold.  If 
three others sell before you do, and the round ends, then you will earn the maximum true 
value of the asset, as explained below. 
 
Here is how the true value is determined. At the start of each trading round, the computer 
randomly selects a trading period at which the true value growth will stop. The true value 
is equal to the asset price until this pre-determined stopping period; that is, the true value 
grows with the price (at the rate of 4%) and stops growing after the pre-determined 
stopping period is reached, while the price continues to grow (at the rate of 4%) in excess 
of the true value. The maximum true value of the asset is equal to the asset price in the 
stopping period. If the trading round continues beyond this period, the asset price still 
grows as before, but the true value of the asset stays at its maximum true value. 
 
You will not learn right away when the true value has stopped growing. After the true 
value stops growing, you will only receive a message (notice), with a delay that is equally 
likely to be anywhere from 0 to 60 periods, indicating that the current price of the asset is 
above its true value. So you will never know the exact time period in which the true value 
stopped growing. A red arrow will indicate the period in which you have received that 
notice and that period will also be posted on the right-hand side of the screen (figure 6, 
7).  
 
The random delay between the time the true value stops growing and the message 
(notice) arrival is randomly chosen separately for each player. Therefore, when you 
receive your message, some players may have already received it, and some might not 
have received it yet. Also, all the messages are private, so you do not know when other 
players receive messages and they do not know when you received your message. 
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In each trading period, there is a 2.5% chance that the true value will stop growing (if it 
has not stopped already). This percentage is constant in each period, which implies that 
even if the round has just begun, there is a small (2.5%) chance it will end in the next 
period, and even if the round has lasted a long time, there is a small (2.5%) chance it will 
end in the next period. 
 
At the end of each trading round, your earnings and the earnings of other players for this 
round will all be displayed on your screen (figure 8). Note that in this example, the 3 
players who did not sell in time will receive the maximum true value of the asset ($3.20 
in the sample screen in figure 8). 
 
In each round, you will be grouped with 5 new computer players. They will receive the 
same amount of information as you do (though at a different time in regards to the 
maximum true value message). However, they will be playing with a pre-determined 
strategy, which will remain consistent throughout the experiment, but unknown to you.  
 
 
Static Trading Rounds 
The static trading rounds are the same as the dynamic rounds with one difference: You 
are presented with your message, and with all of the other information that is revealed 
across time in the dynamic rounds, all at once (figure 9). More specifically, you get to 
step outside of time and see what the stock price would be at any time– under the 
assumption that the market had not ended by that time. The period in which your message 
is received is shown with a red arrow; remember that the message is still randomly 
delayed from the time when the true value stopped growing. You then choose at what 
price along the curve you would sell (and the five computer players will be doing the 
same).  
 
You can explore the stock price over time by moving a little blue bar on the screen 
(figure 10). Place a cursor on any point on the white bar below the x-axis of the price-
period plot to move the blue bar. You do NOT have to hold a button on the mouse. The 
period and the price corresponding to the location of the blue bar will be automatically 
updated in the plot.  
 
When you have determined the period in which (or the price at which) you want to sell 
your asset, press the ENTER key to submit your decision.  
 
Once you submit your decision, the computer compares the selling times of all 6 players 
(you and 5 other computer players), and determines earnings as in a dynamic round. First, 
the computer calculates the time of the market ending as the time by which the first 3 
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players had sold. If your selling time is before the market ended, you will earn an amount 
equivalent to the asset price at which you sold. If your selling time is after that end time 
(i.e., three other players’ chose selling times earlier than yours), you earn the maximum 
true value of the stock as in the dynamic round.  
 
To summarize: 
1. You will be playing with 5 computer players (not other people in the room). 
2. Only 3 players can sell their asset before the trading round ends.  
3. In each trading round, the computer randomly chooses a period and the true value 
of the asset grows with the price up to this period. Afterwards, the price exceeds 
the true value. 
4. Those 3 players who submit their decision in time will receive earnings equivalent 
to the asset price in the period in which they sold their asset. Others will receive 
the maximum true value of the asset. 
5. In dynamic trading rounds, sellers make a real-time decision and will receive a 
message with a random delay after the true value has reached its maximum. 
6. In static trading rounds, sellers learn when a message would have arrived (still 
with a random delay), had they played this round in real time, and you can make a 
selling decision without time pressure. 
 
For you to become familiar with the software, we will ask you to complete 10 practice 
rounds (5 dynamic rounds followed by 5 static rounds). After completing the practice, 
you will go through 5 blocks of rounds with each block consisting of 10 dynamic rounds 
followed by 10 static rounds.  
 
At the end of the experiment, we will sum up the money you earn in all trading rounds 
and pay you in cash. The conversion rate is 100 Experimental Dollars = 0.50 US Dollar. 
Your total earnings will be what you earned in the 100 rounds plus your show-up fee of 
$5. Are there any questions? 
 
You can read these instructions again yourself until you understand how the experiment 
works. When you are ready, please complete the quiz and let the experimenter know 
when you are done. 
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4.6.3  Figures for the instructions 
 
 
Figure 1 The start of a trading round. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 A trading round in action. The price grows exponentially. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 This is not an error. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 You will be notified that the true value has stopped growing already. 
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Figure 7 Note that the sentence in yellow will not appear in the actual screen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
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Figure 9 A static trading round. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Explore the price in each period with the mouse before submitting your 
decision. 
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4.6.4  Quiz 
Name: 
 
Quiz 
 
True or False 
1. You are playing with other people in the room. (True, False) 
2. The price of the asset increases at different rates in dynamic and static rounds. 
(True, False) 
3. The price of the asset never decreases or stops. (True, False) 
4. The maximum true value of the asset is the same as the asset price in the period 
when you receive a notice. (True, False) 
5. The true value of the asset always matches the price. (True, False) 
6. You earn the maximum true value of the asset when the market ends before you 
decide to sell. (True, False) 
7. In static trading rounds, all players earn an amount equal to the price during the 
period in which they chose to sell. (True, False) 
8. There is a 2.5% chance that the true value stops increasing in every period in 
static rounds. (True, False) 
9. There is a 2.5% chance that the asset price stops increasing in every period in 
static rounds. (True, False) 
10. All the players receive the notice that the true value stops growing, but at different 
time points. (True, False) 
11. Your selling price is always greater than the true value of the asset. (True, False) 
12. A trading round ends once three players sold their asset. (True, False) 
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